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PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF 
U. S. SUBMISSION 2011-03 (DOMINICAN REPUBLIC) 
Executive Summary 
 
This report responds to U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic), filed by Father 
Christopher Hartley on December 22, 2011, with the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs 
(OTLA) of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs.  The 
submission alleges violations of the Labor Chapter of the Dominican Republic-Central 
America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which has been in force 
between the United States and the Dominican Republic since March 2007. 
 
Although the Dominican Republic in general has a strong legal framework for protecting 
internationally recognized labor rights, allegations of labor abuses in the Dominican 
sugar sector have been longstanding subjects of international scrutiny.  Reports on 
working conditions in this sector have repeatedly highlighted concerns.  The Government 
of the Dominican Republic has conducted preventive labor inspections across the country 
during the period under review.  However, the OTLA review has identified significant 
concerns about procedural and methodological shortcomings of that inspection process in 
the sugar sector that undermine the government’s capacity to effectively identify labor 
violations.  The United States believes that implementation by the Government of the 
Dominican Republic of the recommendations in this report would help address such 
concerns and would improve the protection and promotion of worker rights in the sugar 
sector. 
     
Purpose of the Report 
 
Under Article 16.2.1 of the CAFTA-DR, the Government of the Dominican Republic is 
obligated not to “fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring 
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties.”1 
 
On December 22, 2011, the OTLA received a public submission under Chapter 16 (the 
Labor Chapter) of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) from Father Christopher Hartley.
2
  On February 22, 2012, the 
OTLA accepted for review U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic), stating that 
it met the criteria for acceptance for review, and published its decision to accept in a 
Federal Register notice on March 15, 2012.
3
 
                                                 
1
 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter CAFTA-
DR], art. 16.2.1.  For the full text of the agreement, see http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text. 
2
 U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic), Formal Public Submission, December 22, 2011, 
available from http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/DRSubmission2011.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 
Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic)].  
3
 77 Fed. Reg. 15397 (March 15, 2012), available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/20120315FRN%20DR.pdf.  
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During the course of its review, the OTLA examined extensive documentation provided 
by the Government of the Dominican Republic and the submitter.  The OTLA also 
undertook two missions to the Dominican Republic to interview relevant stakeholders 
and to gather additional information on the issues raised in the submission.  From April 
22-30, and July 22-26, 2012, OTLA officials, joined by other officials from the U.S. 
Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of State, met with officials from the 
Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dominican Ministry of Labor, and other 
organizations and individuals in the Dominican Republic to gather information relevant 
to the submission.  As part of the review, OTLA officials conducted detailed interviews 
with 71 workers in the Dominican sugar sector.
4
  The interviews were conducted in the 
presence of only OTLA officials and Spanish-Creole interpreters.  The OTLA spoke with 
workers employed by each of the three major sugar companies in the Dominican 
Republic.
5
  The OTLA also met with executives from these companies and carefully 
reviewed information that they provided.
6
 
 
In addition, on June 19, 2012, the OTLA issued a Federal Register notice soliciting 
comments and specific information from the public related to the submission.
7
  
Subsequently, the OTLA carefully reviewed all comments received.  Throughout the 
process, the OTLA consulted with the U.S. Department of State and the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative.  This report presents the OTLA’s findings and 
recommendations based on the information obtained in accordance with the OTLA’s 
Procedural Guidelines.
8
 
 
Summary of U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic) 
 
U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic) alleges that the Government of the 
Dominican Republic failed “to enforce labor laws, as required under Chapter 16 of the 
CAFTA-DR, as these relate to the Dominican sugar industry.”9  The submission asserts 
that labor abuses are occurring on Dominican sugar plantations, including the following: 
(1) human trafficking and/or forced labor; (2) child labor; (3) deplorable and unsanitary 
living conditions; (4) denial of medical, pension, and other benefits due; (5) refusal to 
                                                 
4
 The OTLA interviews with workers from three locations in the sugarcane industry of the Dominican 
Republic, San Pedro de Macorís, Barahona, and La Romana, Dominican Republic, April & July 2012 
[hereinafter The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012]. 
5
 For the 2010-2011 harvest, the three largest sugar producing companies collectively produced 98.13 
percent of the sugar in the Dominican Republic (72.68 percent, 12.75 percent, and 12.70 percent).  
Government of the Dominican Republic, Dominican Sugar Institute (INAZUCAR), Preliminary Report on 
the 2010-2011 Sugar Harvest (Informe Preliminar Sobre la Zafra Azucarera 2010/11), available from 
http://www.inazucar.gov.do/inf_preliminar_zafra2010-2011.pdf (last visited September 4, 2013), p. 4. 
6
 Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the three major sugar companies, Santo Domingo (April 
23-24, 2012), San Pedro de Macorís (July 23, 2012), and Barahona (July 24, 2012), Dominican Republic.   
7
 77 Fed. Reg. 36578 (June 19, 2012), available from  
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/20120619.pdf.  
8
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006), available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/2006021837.pdf.  
9
 U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic).  
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inform and publish the current rate and terms of pay; (6) hazardous working conditions; 
(7) refusal to issue written work contracts; (8) manipulation in the weighing of sugarcane; 
and (9) retaliatory firing of workers for affiliation with or attempts to organize labor 
groups or unions and/or for their participation in legal proceedings against employers.
10
  
The submission claims that these labor abuses demonstrate that the government has failed 
to effectively enforce labor laws as defined in the CAFTA-DR with respect to: (a) the 
right of association; (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on 
the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for the 
employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child 
labor; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health.
11
 
 
Findings 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related 
to allegations of violations of the labor rights covered by Article 16.8 of the CAFTA-DR 
in the sugar sector.  The OTLA found evidence of apparent and potential violations of 
labor law in that sector with respect to: (1) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health; (2) a minimum age 
for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of 
child labor; and (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor.  
The OTLA also noted concerns in the sugar sector with respect to Dominican labor law 
on freedom of association, the right to organize, and collective bargaining.  The OTLA’s 
review also raised significant concerns about procedural and methodological 
shortcomings in the inspection process, including failure to follow Dominican guidelines 
for such inspections, that undermine the government’s capacity to effectively identify 
labor violations. 
 
Within the Dominican Republic’s legal and institutional framework, the Ministry of 
Labor’s inspectorate bears primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with labor 
laws.  The OTLA requested from the Government of the Dominican Republic 
information on any labor inspections conducted in the sugar sector since the CAFTA-DR 
entered into force.  In response, the Dominican government submitted documentation to 
the OTLA on June 22, 2012, summarizing information from 14 reports on preventive 
inspections conducted in the sugar sector from 2007 through February 2012 and attached 
the 14 corresponding inspection reports as annexes.  Additional information on country-
wide inspections provided by the Government of the Dominican Republic to the OTLA 
on June 22 and previously to the ILO indicates that the Ministry of Labor conducted a 
total of 284,953 preventive inspections across the country from 2007 through September 
2011.
12
 
                                                 
10
 U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic). 
11
 CAFTA-DR, art. 16.8.  
12
 The Government of the Dominican Republic reported to the OTLA that it conducted 38,604 preventive 
inspections on a national level from January through September 2011.  Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Declaration of the Government of the Dominican Republic About the Public Submission of 
Father Christopher Hartley, June 22, 2012, [hereinafter Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 
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The OTLA’s review raises significant concerns about procedural and methodological 
shortcomings in the inspection process for the sugar sector that undermine the 
government’s capacity to effectively identify labor violations.  For example, Spanish-
speaking inspectors were responsible for interviewing Creole-speaking workers with 
limited or no Spanish, interviewed only a small number of workers, only spoke with 
workers about topics relevant to assessing labor law compliance on 17 percent of the sites 
inspected, and questioned workers in front of their supervisors.
13
 
 
In addition, the 14 inspection reports produced by the Government of the Dominican 
Republic indicate that inspectors conducted only one follow-up inspection to verify 
remediation of violations identified and no case against a sugar company was transferred 
by the Ministry of Labor to the relevant court for the application of a fine for failure to 
remedy an identified labor violation during the roughly five-year period at issue.  The 14 
inspection reports further reveal instances where it appears that inspectors did not 
respond to specific allegations of labor law violations conveyed by workers to inspectors 
during inspections, failing to discuss the allegations with employers, issue related 
warnings, as appropriate, and conduct follow-up inspections.
14
  The few workers 
interviewed by the OTLA who reported alleging labor law violations to labor inspectors 
similarly stated that they observed no follow-up or subsequent change in conditions.
15
 
 
Recommendations 
 
In order to address the concerns identified in the course of its review, the OTLA makes 
the following recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic, 
particularly regarding enforcement of Dominican labor laws in the sugar sector: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
response], Annex XVIII.  The Government of the Dominican Republic also reported that it conducted 
65,482 preventive inspections in 2010; 62,891 in 2009; 59,503 in 2008; and 58,473 in 2007.  ILO, 
Verification Report on the Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, August – December 2010, p. 
136, available from http://www.ilo.org/sanjose/publicaciones/WCMS_180195/lang--es/index.htm (last 
visited September 4, 2013).   
13
 See, e.g., Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of December 18, 2007; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 079/09, October 22, 2009; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/10, January 14, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 109/2010, May 18, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 023/2011of January 31, 2011; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection  of February 29, 2012; Government 
of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 176, May 9, 2012; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 190, June 6, 2012; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of firing of worker 16099, October 18, 2012.   
14
 Specifically, workers complained to inspectors about employer manipulation of the weighing of 
sugarcane, delayed payments to workers, full latrines in the labor camps, and employers’ failure to provide 
safety equipment to workers.  Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 
028/2010 of February 1, 2010; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 
025/2010 of May 18, 2010; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 
023/2011 of January 31, 2011. 
15
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
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 Follow the Ministry of Labor’s 2008 General Inspection Protocol, 2011 
Inspection Protocol for Agriculture, and other best practices for labor inspections, 
including: 
o speaking with significant numbers of workers chosen by inspectors; 
o interviewing workers outside the presence of management representatives; 
o discussing with workers, in all cases, matters related to labor law 
compliance; 
o following up on allegations of labor law violations made by workers 
during the inspection process; and  
o conducting follow-up inspections to verify remediation of violations 
identified. 
 
 Use labor inspectors or interpreters with the language skills necessary to 
communicate with workers in the sugar sector, in particular Creole;  
 
 Provide training for labor inspectors on methods and best practices for identifying 
forced labor and indicators of forced labor, child labor, and violations of 
acceptable conditions of work, including with respect to minimum wages, hours 
of work, and occupational safety and health, particularly with regards to the sugar 
sector;  
 
 Conduct outreach campaigns to sugar sector workers to inform them of their labor 
rights and increase awareness of existing methods to anonymously complain and 
provide information to the Ministry of Labor about alleged labor law violations.  
Ensure that any such methods involving verbal communication are staffed with 
sufficient personnel with relevant language skills, in particular Creole; 
  
 Formally and publicly commit that the Ministry of Labor will maintain the 
confidentiality and anonymity of workers involved in inspections or who have 
filed complaints with the Ministry, as recommended in the 2008 General 
Inspection Protocol and regardless of migration status; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of the 2012 Minimum Wage Resolution requiring visible 
posting of the minimum wage in the workplace; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of Article 161 of the Labor Code requiring employers to 
record workers’ hours of work and compensation due and effectively enforce 
other labor laws related to hours of work and the minimum wage, with a 
particular focus on ensuring payment of the minimum wage, a 36-hour weekly 
rest period or premium pay or a subsequent day off for working that period, 
workdays under the 10-hour limit for agriculture, and paid holidays;  
 
 Strengthen enforcement of relevant laws governing workers’ social security 
contributions to ensure that workers who are legally entitled to social security 
 vi 
 
benefits are able to receive them, that employers do not deduct contributions from 
workers who are not legally entitled to receive benefits, and that workers who are 
ineligible for benefits can fully recover any deducted amounts;   
 
 Strengthen enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation 522-06 
and Resolution 04-2007 requiring employers to provide all workers with a 
sufficient quantity of potable water or other healthy beverage and free adequate 
personal safety equipment;  
 
 Strengthen enforcement of Labor Code Articles 245 and 247 and Labor 
Resolution 52/2004 establishing 14 as the minimum age for legal employment, 
limiting the workday to six hours for children under 16, and banning dangerous 
and unhealthy work for children under 18, to prevent unlawful child labor in the 
sugar sector, including by establishing a system to verify the ages of young 
workers without birth certificates or other legal documentation to help protect 
them from exploitation; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of Article 62.2 of the Labor Code prohibiting forced 
labor, including by developing and implementing a plan to address conditions 
contributing to and indicators of forced labor, including unlawful overtime 
performed under threat, deceptive recruitment practices, fear of dismissal or 
deportation for formally complaining about unlawful labor conditions, fear of 
deportation or denouncement to authorities for quitting work or leaving the 
bateyes, a bonus payment system that creates pressure for workers to return to 
work each season or remain on the bateyes year-round, and growing indebtedness 
to local privately-owned colmados on the bateyes.     
 
 
The OTLA will engage with the Government of the Dominican Republic to address the 
concerns identified in this report and implement the above recommendations.  The OTLA 
will work with the Government of the Dominican Republic to develop time-bound steps 
and measurable milestones by which to monitor and assess progress and will review 
implementation of the recommendations six months and again 12 months after the 
publication of this report.  
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I. Introduction  
 
The Dominican Republic signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) on August 5, 2004, and the agreement entered into 
force between the United States and the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007.
16
  The 
CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter states that each Party shall designate an office within its labor 
ministry or equivalent entity to serve as a contact point with the other Parties and with the 
public.
17
  For the United States, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Trade and 
Labor Affairs (OTLA) was designated as this contact point in a Federal Register notice 
published on December 21, 2006.
18
 
 
On December 22, 2011, the OTLA received a public submission under Chapter 16 (the 
Labor Chapter) of the CAFTA-DR from Father Christopher Hartley.
19
  U.S. Submission 
2011-03 (Dominican Republic) alleges “the failure of the Government of the Dominican 
Republic to enforce labor laws, as required under Chapter 16 of the CAFTA-DR, as these 
relate to the Dominican sugar industry.”20  In Article 16.2.1 of the CAFTA-DR, the 
Government of the Dominican Republic committed not to “fail to effectively enforce its 
labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner 
affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”21 
 
The submission asserts that the following labor abuses are occurring on Dominican sugar 
plantations: (1) human trafficking and/or forced labor; (2) child labor; (3) deplorable and 
unsanitary living conditions; (4) denial of medical, pension, and other benefits due; (5) 
refusal to inform and publish the current rate and terms of pay; (6) hazardous working 
conditions; (7) refusal to issue written work contracts; (8) manipulation in the weighing 
of sugarcane; and (9) retaliatory firing of workers for affiliation with or attempts to 
organize labor groups or unions and/or for their participation in legal proceedings against 
employers.
22
 
 
The submission alleges that these labor abuses represent a failure to effectively enforce 
“labor laws” with respect to each element of the CAFTA-DR Article 16.8 definition of 
that term: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum 
age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
                                                 
16
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America 
FTA), available from http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-
republic-central-america-fta.   
17
The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter CAFTA-
DR], art. 16.4.3.  
18
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006), available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/2006021837.pdf [hereinafter 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006)].  
19
 U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic), Formal Public Submission, December 22, 2011, 
available from http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/DRSubmission2011.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 
Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic)].   
20
 Ibid. 
21
 CAFTA-DR, art. 16.2.1. 
22
 U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic). 
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forms of child labor; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
23
 
 
Under the Labor Chapter, each Party’s contact point provides for the submission, receipt, 
and consideration of communications on matters related to the Chapter and reviews such 
communications in accordance with domestic procedures.
24
  The same Federal Register 
notice that designated the OTLA as such contact point also set out the Procedural 
Guidelines that the OTLA follows for the receipt and review of public submissions.  
According to the definitions contained in the Procedural Guidelines, a “submission” 
means “a communication from the public containing specific allegations, accompanied 
by relevant supporting information, that another Party has failed to meet its commitments 
or obligations arising under a labor chapter.”25 
 
On February 22, 2012, the OTLA accepted for review U.S. Submission 2011-03 
(Dominican Republic), stating that it met the criteria for acceptance.  The decision to 
accept the submission was published in a Federal Register notice on March 15, 2012.
26
 
 
Under the Procedural Guidelines, the OTLA shall issue a public report within 180 days of 
the acceptance of a submission for review, unless circumstances as determined by the 
OTLA require an extension of time.  On August 17, 2012, the OTLA notified the 
Government of the Dominican Republic and the submitter that it was extending the 
period for review; this decision to extend was published in the Federal Register on 
August 27, 2012.
27
 
 
The OTLA conducted a review designed to gather information to better understand and 
publicly report on the issues raised by the submission.  Throughout the process, the 
OTLA consulted with the U.S. Department of State and the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative.  The OTLA reviewed thoroughly the documentation provided by the 
submitter, including the original submission and well over 400 additional documents, 
emails, videos, and photographs, as well as information provided by the Government of 
the Dominican Republic and by others with direct knowledge of the relevant issues.  In 
addition, on June 19, 2012, the OTLA issued a Federal Register notice soliciting 
comments and specific information from the public related to the submission, subsequent 
to which the OTLA carefully reviewed all comments received.
28
 
 
The OTLA also undertook two missions to the Dominican Republic to interview relevant 
stakeholders and to gather additional information on the issues raised in the submission.  
From April 22-30, and July 22-26, 2012, OTLA officials, joined by officials from the 
                                                 
23
 U.S. Submission 2011-03 (Dominican Republic); CAFTA-DR, art. 16.8.  
24
 CAFTA-DR, art. 16.4.3. 
25
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006).  
26
 77 Fed. Reg. 15397 (March 15, 2012), available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/20120315FRN%20DR.pdf.  
27
 77 Fed. Reg. 51828 (Aug. 27, 2012), available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/FRNDRExtension.pdf. 
28
 77 Fed. Reg. 36578 (June 19, 2012), available from  
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/20120619.pdf.  
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U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of State, met with officials from the 
Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dominican Ministry of Labor, and other 
organizations and individuals in the Dominican Republic.  As part of the review, OTLA 
officials conducted detailed interviews with 71 workers in the Dominican sugar sector.
29
  
The interviews were conducted in the presence of only OTLA officials and Spanish-
Creole interpreters.  The OTLA spoke with workers employed by each of the three major 
sugar companies in the Dominican Republic.
30
  The OTLA also met with executives from 
these companies and carefully reviewed information that they provided.
31
 
II. Analysis and Findings 
 
CAFTA-DR defines “labor laws” as “a Party’s statutes or regulations, or provisions 
thereof, that are directly related to the following internationally recognized labor rights: 
(a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) a 
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for 
the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of 
child labor; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours 
of work, and occupational safety and health.”32  The following sections discuss in detail 
the OTLA’s findings with respect to apparent and potential violations of Dominican labor 
laws covering the areas raised in the public submission and in other materials received 
during the OTLA review, and related concerns regarding the Government of the 
Dominican Republic’s enforcement of labor laws covering those areas. 
 
A. Acceptable conditions of work  
1. Minimum wages and hours of work 
 
Dominican law sets the minimum wage for field workers in the sugar sector at 129 pesos 
($3.08) per eight-hour workday, which is lower than the minimum wage for any other 
sector.
33
  The minimum wage is to be prorated for workdays of more or less than eight 
                                                 
29
 The OTLA interviews with workers from three locations in the sugarcane industry, San Pedro de 
Macorís, Barahona, and La Romana, Dominican Republic, April & July 2012 [hereinafter The OTLA 
interviews with workers, April & July 2012]. 
30
 For the 2010-2011 harvest, the three largest sugar producing companies collectively produced 98.13 
percent of the sugar in the Dominican Republic (72.68 percent, 12.75 percent, and 12.70 percent).  
Government of the Dominican Republic, Dominican Sugar Institute (INAZUCAR), Preliminary Report on 
the 2010-2011 Sugar Harvest (Informe Preliminar Sobre la Zafra Azucarera 2010/11), available from 
http://www.inazucar.gov.do/inf_preliminar_zafra2010-2011.pdf (last visited September 4, 2013), p. 4. 
31
 Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the three major sugar companies, Santo Domingo (April 
23-24, 2012), San Pedro de Macorís (July 23, 2012), and Barahona (July 24, 2012), Dominican Republic 
[hereinafter Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the three major sugar companies, April & July 
2012].   
32
 CAFTA-DR, art. 16.8.  
33
 National Salary Committee, Resolution 1/2012 About the National Minimum Wage for Workers of the 
Sugar Industry (Resolución No. 1/2012 Sobre Salario Mínimo Nacional para los trabajadores de la 
Industria Azucarera), article 3, 2012 [hereinafter 2012 Minimum Wage Resolution].  See also, e.g., El 
Nacional, Aumentan salario mínimo a trabajadores azucarero del país, March 8, 2012, available from  
 4 
 
hours.
34
  The Labor Code establishes that workers may never receive less than the 
minimum wage.
35
 
 
Article 281 of the Labor Code exempts agricultural employers from the general eight-
hour workday and 44-hour workweek limits contained in Article 147,
36
 but it states that 
in no case can the workday in agriculture exceed 10 hours.
37
  The Labor Code also 
establishes that workers have the right to receive 36 uninterrupted hours of rest per week, 
regardless of the sector.
38
  The weekly rest period is to begin at noon on Saturday, unless 
the parties agree on a different day and time or the worker elects to receive a payment 
instead.
39
  The Labor Code states that if a worker works during his or her weekly rest 
period, he or she can opt to either receive the normal daily pay plus a 100 percent 
premium or receive an extra day of rest during the following week.
40
  In addition, all 
legal holidays, declared by the Constitution or other laws, are considered to be paid non-
working days for workers, unless they coincide with weekly days of rest.
41
  The Labor 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.elnacional.com.do/nacional/2012/3/8/114190/Aumentan-salario-minimo-a-
trabajadoresazucarero-del-pais (last visited September 4, 2013).  U.S. Department of State, 2012 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominican Republic, available from 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper [hereinafter 2012 State 
Department Human Rights Report].  The 129 peso/day minimum wage took effect in February 2012, and 
therefore it was applicable throughout the period of the OTLA’s review.  Because the new rate took effect 
only months before the OTLA’s first investigation trip, however, the OTLA also assessed the evidence 
using the prior 110 peso/day minimum wage and reached the same conclusions.  See National Salary 
Committee, Resolution 1/2010 About the National Minimum Wage for Workers of the Sugar Industry 
(Resolución No. 1/2010 Sobre Salario Mínimo Nacional para los trabajadores de la Industria Azucarera), 
article 3, 2010 [hereinafter 2010 Minimum Wage Resolution].   
34
 2010 Minimum Wage Resolution; 2012 Minimum Wage Resolution.   
35
 The Labor Code of the Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo, August 2007, available from 
http://www.suprema.gov.do/PDF_2/codigos/Codigo_Trabajo.pdf (last visited September 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter Labor Code], art. 193.  The Spanish phrasing of article 193 is:  “El monto del salario es el que 
haya sido convenido en el contrato de trabajo.  No puede ser, en ningún caso, inferior al tipo de salario 
mínimo legalmente establecido.”   
36
 Ibid., art. 147.  The Spanish phrasing of article 147 is: “La duración normal de la jornada de trabajo es 
la determinada en el contrato.  No podrá exceder de ocho horas por día ni de cuarenta y cuatro horas por 
semana.”    
37
 Ibid., art. 281.  The Spanish phrasing of article 281 is: “Son aplicables a las empresas agrícolas, 
agrícolas industriales, pecuarias o forestales todos las disposiciones de este Código con excepción de las 
relativas a las jornadas de trabajo y cierre de establecimientos.  En todo caso, la jornada no excederá de 
diez horas diarias.”    
38
 Ibid., art. 163.  The Spanish phrasing of article 163 is: “Todo trabajador tiene derecho a un descanso 
semanal ininterrumpido de treinta y seis horas.  Este descanso será el convenido entre las partes y puede 
iniciarse cualquier día de la semana.  A falta de convención expresa, se inicia a partir del sábado a 
mediodía.”  
39
 Ibid.   
40
 Ibid., art. 164.  The Spanish phrasing of article 164 is: “Si el trabajador presta servicio en el período de 
su descanso semanal, puede optar entre recibir su salario ordinario aumentado en un ciento por ciento o 
disfrutar en la semana siguiente de un descanso compensatorio igual al tiempo de su descanso semanal.” 
41
 Ibid., art. 165.  The Spanish phrasing of article 165 is: “Los días declaradas no laborales por la 
Constitución o las leyes, son de descanso remunerado para el trabajador, salvo que coincidan con el día 
de descanso semanal.” 
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Code requires employers to keep records for each employee that include both hours of 
work and compensation due.
42
 
 
The Ministry of Labor’s 2008 General Inspection Protocol and 2011 Inspection Protocol 
for Agriculture provide inspectors with instructions on how to verify compliance with 
Dominican labor laws in the agricultural sector, including the sugar sector.
43
  These 
Protocols instruct inspectors to speak with both workers and employers and to review 
payroll records, attendance records, and pay stubs to verify compliance with Dominican 
laws on wages and hours of work, including that the salary received by workers is equal 
to or greater than the minimum wage; that agricultural workers are not working more 
than 10 hours per day; and that workers are receiving a weekly uninterrupted 36-hour rest 
period, or premium compensation or a subsequent extra day of rest, and paid non-
working holidays.
44
 
 
An executive of one of the major sugar companies told the OTLA, however, that the 
company does not keep employee records such as those referenced in the Inspection 
Protocols.
45
  This lack of records makes it difficult for the Ministry of Labor to verify 
how much a worker is making per hour and, as a result, also makes it difficult to 
determine whether employers are paying the minimum wage. 
 
This difficulty of determining whether employers are paying at least the minimum wage 
is exacerbated by employers’ regular use of a piece- or weight-based payment system, 
which enables employers to pay workers without tracking hours of work, despite the legal 
requirement to do so.  Both workers and employers stated that workers in the sugar sector 
are usually paid on a piece-rate basis.  This means that cutters are paid according to how 
many stacks, piles, or kilograms of sugarcane they cut, and workers clearing and 
replanting fields are paid based on the area cleared or replanted.
46
 
 
According to an executive of one of the major sugar companies, in 2011, approximately 
55 percent of sugarcane cutters were able to harvest sufficient sugarcane to equal or 
exceed the minimum wage.
47
  Interviewed workers stated that the piece-rate payment 
                                                 
42
 Labor Code, art. 161.  The Spanish phrasing of article 161 is: “El empleador está obligado a llevar 
registros, conforme a modelos aprobados por el Departamento de Trabajo, en los cuales deben hacerse las 
siguientes menciones relativas a cada trabajador: (1) horario de trabajo; (2) interrupciones del trabajo y 
sus causas; (3) horas trabajadas en exceso de la jornada; (4) monto de las remuneraciones debidas; (5) 
edad y sexo.”   
43
 Ministry of Labor of the Dominican Republic, Inspection Protocol for Agriculture in the Dominican 
Republic (Protocolo de Inspección para la Agricultura, República Dominicana), Santo Domingo, March 
2011 [hereinafter Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection Protocol]; Ministry of Labor of the Dominican 
Republic, Collection of Inspection Protocols, San José, October 2008 [hereinafter Ministry of Labor, 
General Inspection Protocol].   
44
 Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection Protocol, pp. 24-30; Ministry of Labor, General Inspection 
Protocol, pp. 18-19, 32, 35-36.  
45
 Meeting between the OTLA and sugar executives, San Pedro de Macorís, July 2012.  
46
 Meetings between the OTLA and the executives of the three major sugar companies, April & July, 2012; 
The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
47
 Meeting between the OTLA and sugar executives, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, April 23, 2012.  
In subsequent material provided to the OTLA, the executives of one company represented this figure 
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system used for sugarcane cutters is especially hard on elderly or infirm workers, who 
often cut at a slower pace, and that despite a legal obligation to do so, sugar companies 
do not always ensure that all workers are earning the minimum wage.
48
  Both the State 
Department’s Human Rights Report and the OTLA’s interviews with workers further 
indicate that some workers who remain on sugar plantations during the non-harvest 
season to clear and re-plant the sugarcane fields also earn less than the minimum wage.
49
  
Interviewed workers stated that if the terrain is difficult or the overgrowth is thick, 
workers in some cases are unable to clear or replant a sufficient area to make the 
minimum wage for a full day’s work.50  Some of the interviewed workers explained to 
the OTLA that the daily wages they receive are sometimes so low that they do not 
provide them with enough money to eat.
51
 
 
Interviewed workers from all three major sugar companies, executives of those 
companies, a communication sent to the OTLA by the Government of the Dominican 
Republic, and a June 2013 report by the Dominican sugar industry also explained that in 
some cases, the net salaries of both documented and undocumented workers are further 
reduced by employers taking monthly deductions from the workers’ paychecks for 
Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) contributions.
52
  The law regarding 
undocumented workers’ eligibility for IDSS benefits is unclear.  Although Article 60 of 
                                                                                                                                                 
slightly differently, stating, “During the 2011 harvest season, 56% of total man weeks for cane cutting 
activities equaled or exceeded the weekly minimum wage.” Consorcio Azucarero de Empresas Industriales 
(CAEI), Written Comments Submission of the Consorcio Azucarero de Empresas Industriales (CAEI), of 
the Dominican Republic on The Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) Notice of Determination 
Regarding Review of Submission #2011-03, Accepted on February 22, 2012, Pursuant to Article 16.4.3 of 
the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), July 9, 2012 
[hereinafter CAEI Response, July 9, 2012], p. 13.   
48
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012; 2012 State Department Human Rights Report 
(stating, “Less able-bodied workers, who were often older, were paid only for the amount of the cane they 
cut, even if the amount was less than the minimum wage.”).  
49
 2012 State Department Human Rights Report; The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
50
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  Workers reported that the payment for this 
offseason work is 41 pesos/hectare and, if the terrain is bad, a worker may be unable to finish a hectare in a 
full workday.  Such payment would be less than 33 percent of the minimum wage of 129 pesos per eight-
hour workday. 2012 State Department Human Rights Report (stating, “During the six-month off-season, 
some workers in sugar plantations remained in their communities and worked part-time jobs clearing land 
or cleaning sugarcane.  Such workers reported that they were not paid the legally mandated minimum 
wage.”).  
51
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012; See 2012 State Department Human Rights 
Report (noting, “Although no official estimate of the poverty income level was available, the Worker 
Rights Consortium estimated the living wage was over 18,000 pesos ($456) per month.”). 
52
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012; Meetings between the OTLA and executives of 
the three major sugar companies, April & July 2012; Government of the Dominican Republic, Declaration 
of the Government of the Dominican Republic About the Public Submission of Father Christopher Hartley, 
June 22, 2012, [hereinafter Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 response], p. 10; Dominican 
Republic Sugar Industry, Labor Practices in the Dominican Sugar Industry: Recent Developments in 
Working Conditions in the Sugar Sector, June 2013 [hereinafter Sugar Industry June 2013 Report], pp. 10, 
21-22.  In interviews with the OTLA delegation, employers asserted that the practice of deducting social 
security payments varies across companies, with some employers acknowledging that they make the 
deductions from workers’ paychecks, while others saying they do not.  Meetings between the OTLA and 
executives of the three major sugar companies, April & July 2012. 
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the Constitution states that “every person has a right to social security,”53 the Social 
Security Act of 2001 provides in Article 5 that only Dominican citizens and legal 
residents have that right.
54
  Further clouding this issue is the recent initiative undertaken 
by the Government of the Dominican Republic to provide identity cards and social 
security benefits to temporary migrant workers in the Dominican Republic, regardless of 
documentation.
55
  In practice, some undocumented workers told the OTLA that they are 
unable to access IDSS benefits funded by those paycheck deductions.
56
  Additionally, 
with the help of legal assistance, in 2004, 52 undocumented sugarcane workers filed 
forms with the IDSS requesting their pensions.
57
  At the time of this report, the OTLA 
understands that none of these workers has successfully received a pension through these 
requests.
58
  These IDSS deductions thus may result in undocumented workers being paid 
less than they are legally due, to the extent that they are unable to access benefits to 
which their deductions contributed. 
 
Many interviewed workers also believe that their wages are artificially low due to 
manipulation of the weighing of cut sugarcane, resulting in paychecks that reflect less 
sugarcane than they actually cut.
59
  An inspection report produced by the Government of 
the Dominican Republic, for example, documents that during one inspection, two 
workers complained of employers’ inaccurate weighing of cut sugarcane and eight 
workers complained that they were paid the lower rate for burnt sugarcane, when in fact 
they cut green cane.
60
  Employers acknowledge that the sugarcane often is not weighed in 
workers’ presence, but instead is transported to be weighed elsewhere while the 
sugarcane cutters continue working.
61
 
 
                                                 
53 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, Gaceta Oficial No. 10561, January 26, 2010, available from 
http://www.suprema.gov.do/PDF_2/constitucion/Constitucion.pdf (last visited September 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter Constitution of the Dominican Republic], art. 60.  The Spanish phrasing of article 60 is:  “Toda 
persona tiene derecho a la seguridad social.” 
54
 Ministry of Labor, National Social Security Council, Law No. 87-01, that creates the Dominican 
National Social Security System, May 9, 2001, available from www.sisalril.gov.do/pdf/ley8701.pdf (last 
visited September 4, 2013). 
55
 Listin Diario, Gobierno regulariza mano de obra extranjera en RD: 220 Obreros Temporeros Recibieron 
Sus Carnés, January 14, 2013, available from http://www.listin.com.do/la-
republica/2013/1/13/262065/Gobierno-regulariza-mano-de-obra-extranjera-en-RD (last visited September 
4, 2013); Hoy Digital, Cañeros pensionados agradecen a periodistas con caminata, January 23, 2013, 
available from  http://www.hoy.com.do/el-pais/2013/1/23/463955/Caneros-pensionados-agradecen-a-
periodistas-con-caminata  (last visited September 4, 2013).  
56
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012; In an inspection report provided by the 
Government of the Dominican Republic, workers complained that state medical care costs were deducted 
from their paychecks but that they did not receive the corresponding services.  Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 031/10, January 26, 2010.   
57
 Forms filed with the Dominican Social Security Institute, Department of Risk Management, requesting 
pensions on behalf of 52 sugarcane workers, April 2004. 
58
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012; Phone conversation between the OTLA and local 
contact, November 9, 2012.  
59
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.   
60
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/2010, May 18, 2010. 
61
 Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the three major sugar companies, April & July 2012.  
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Under the 2010 and 2012 Minimum Wage Resolutions, employers are required to visibly 
post the minimum wage in the workplace,
62
 but workers interviewed by the OTLA 
described employer failure to do so, and the OTLA did not see any minimum wage 
postings during any of the visits to the bateyes or worksites.
63
  The lack of minimum 
wage postings, combined with the general absence of written work contracts in the 
sector,
64
 has meant that interviewed workers often lacked specific knowledge about the 
precise amount of payments and benefits they were due,
65
 potentially further deterring 
them from reporting or complaining about suspected wage violations. 
 
Most workers interviewed also told the OTLA that they regularly work over the legal 
limit of 10 hours per day, many reporting 12-hour days or longer.  Thirty-three of the 56 
workers interviewed by the OTLA delegation who responded to questions about days 
worked per week reported working seven days a week without the weekly 36-hour rest 
period.
66
  Workers indicated that when they forfeit the 36-hour rest period, they do not 
receive premium pay or a subsequent day off, as required by the Labor Code.
67
  None of 
the interviewed workers reported receiving the legally required paid holidays off.
68
 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related 
to payment of minimum wage and hours worked in the Dominican sugar sector.  
Information reviewed included worker allegations of employers’ failures to pay the 
minimum wage, provide premium pay or a subsequent day off for working during the 36-
hour rest period, ensure workers are not working in excess of the 10-hour daily limit for 
agriculture, grant workers paid holidays, visibly display the minimum wage in the 
workplace, and record the hours worked by each employee, as well as the findings of 
payment below the minimum wage by the 2012 U.S. Department of State’s Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices for the Dominican Republic, and statements and 
information provided by the Government of the Dominican Republic and representatives 
of the sugar companies, including the June 2013 report by the Dominican sugar industry.  
Based on this review, the OTLA has found sufficient evidence of apparent and potential 
violations of the labor laws of the Dominican Republic related to minimum wage and 
hours of work in the sugar sector to warrant further Government inspection and, as 
appropriate, sanction and remediation. 
 
 
                                                 
62
 2010 Minimum Wage Resolution; 2012 Minimum Wage Resolution. 
63
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
64
 Ibid.  Only one worker with whom the OTLA spoke reported having a written work contract. 
65
 Ibid.   
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Ibid.  The OTLA calculated the wage that each interviewed worker is due based on the hours of work the 
worker reported.  According to these calculations, most workers do not always make minimum wage plus 
the premium owed for forfeiting the 36-hour rest period and working paid holidays.   
68
 Ibid.; For a list of legally required paid holidays, see Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry 
of Labor, Ministerio de Trabajo informa sobre días feriados del 2012, November 2, 2011, available from 
http://www.ministeriodetrabajo.gob.do/index.php/todas-las-noticias/196-ministerio-de-trabajo-informa-
sobre-dias-feriados-del-2012 (last visited September 4, 2013).  
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2. Occupational safety and health 
 
The Constitution of the Dominican Republic establishes employers’ responsibilities 
regarding the occupational safety and health of their employees: “It is the obligation of all 
employers to guarantee to workers conditions of safety, health, hygiene, and a suitable 
work environment.”69  Through Occupational Safety and Health Regulation 522-06 and 
Resolution 04-2007, the Ministry of Labor sets the rights and duties of employers and 
employees with respect to health and safety at work.
70
  According to these provisions, 
employers are required to provide workers with “adequate” personal safety equipment 
free of cost,
71
 though “adequate” appears undefined in law or regulation.  Resolution 04-
2007 also requires employers to make a “sufficient” quantity of potable water or other 
healthy beverage available to workers,
72
 though “sufficient” appears undefined, as well.  
The Ministry of Labor’s 2008 General Inspection Protocol and 2011 Inspection Protocol 
for Agriculture instruct inspectors to speak with both workers and employers to verify 
compliance with these requirements, as well as other workplace health and safety 
provisions.
73
 
 
Many interviewed workers stated that they are not provided with potable water during the 
workday.
74
  This problem is exacerbated by the lack of clean drinking water in some 
workers’ communities, known as bateyes,75 where most workers employed in the sugar 
                                                 
69
 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 62.8.  The Spanish phrasing of article 62.8 is: “Es 
obligación de todo empleador garantizar a sus trabajadores condiciones de seguridad, salubridad, higiene 
y ambiente de trabajo adecuados.”   
70
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 
Decree Number 522-06, October 17, 2006, available from 
http://www.set.gov.do/documentospdf/dghsi/Reglamento522-06.pdf (last visited September 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter Regulation 522-06]; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Resolution 
No. 04/2007, January 30, 2007 , available from 
http://www.set.gov.do/documentospdf/dghsi/Reglamento522-06.pdf (last visited September 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter Resolution 04/2007].  The occupational safety and health laws of the Dominican Republic 
apply equally to Dominicans, documented migrant workers, and undocumented migrant workers.  
Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 response, p. 9.   
71
 Regulation 522-06, art. 7.9.  The Spanish phrasing of article 7 is: “Obligaciones del empleador en lo 
referente a la acción preventiva.  El empleador aplicará las siguientes medidas de prevención: (7.9) 
Proporcionar, sin ningún costo para el trabajador, los equipos de protección individual adecuados.”; 
Resolution 04/2007, art. 5.1.2.  The Spanish phrasing of article 5 is: “El empleador estará en la obligación 
de: (5.1.2) Proporcionar gratuitamente a los trabajadores los equipos de protección individual que deban 
utilizar, reponiéndolos cuando resulte necesario.”   
72
 Resolution 04/2007, art. 1.16.  The Spanish phrasing of article 1.16 is: “Se deberá poner a disposición de 
los trabajadores, en cantidad suficiente, agua potable o cualquier otra bebida sana.  En las fuentes de 
agua se indicará si ésta es o no potable, siempre que puedan existir dudas al respecto.”  
73
 Ministry of Labor, General Inspection Protocol, pp. 16-21; Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection 
Protocol, pp. 17-23. 
74
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.   
75
 Ibid.; The OTLA observational visits to bateyes, La Romana, San Pedro de Macoris, and Barahona, 
Dominican Republic, April & July 2012; Meetings between the OTLA and local contacts, April 2012.  
Poor water quality in the bateyes was documented by the Government of the Dominican Republic as early 
as 2009, when inspectors noted the “brackish” quality of supposedly potable water during a preventive 
inspection.  Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 079/09, October 
22, 2009. 
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sector traditionally reside.  These villages also often lack adequate housing, medical 
services, and other basic sanitary services.
76
 
 
In addition, many interviewed workers stated that their employers do not provide them 
with basic safety equipment, including gloves and boots.
77
  Sixteen of the 51 workers 
interviewed by the OTLA delegation who responded to questions about safety equipment 
reported receiving no safety gear.  Nine of the 51 reported receiving full or partial safety 
equipment but stated that the cost of the equipment is deducted from their paychecks.
78
  
In contrast, the June 2013 report by the Dominican Republic sugar industry asserts that 
all three major sugar companies provide all their workers with safety gear.
 79
  One of the 
three explicitly claims that the equipment is provided at no cost to workers, despite 
reports to the contrary from some of that company’s workers.80 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related 
to occupational safety and health in the Dominican sugar sector, including: reports of 
employers’ failure to provide workers with adequate personal safety equipment free of 
cost and to make a sufficient quantity of potable water or other healthy beverage 
available to workers, as well as statements and information provided by the Government 
of the Dominican Republic and representatives of the sugar companies, including the 
June 2013 report by the Dominican sugar industry.  Based on this review, the OTLA has 
found sufficient evidence of apparent and potential violations of the labor laws of the 
Dominican Republic related to occupational safety and health in the sugar sector to 
warrant further Government inspection and, as appropriate, sanction and remediation. 
 
B. The right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively 
 
The Constitution and the Labor Code of the Dominican Republic establish the freedom to 
associate, to assemble, and to unionize.  Article 47 of the Constitution states, “Every 
person has the right to associate for lawful purposes,”81 and Article 48 asserts, “Every 
person has the right to meet for lawful and peaceful purposes without previous 
permission.”82  Both the Constitution and the Labor Code recognize the right to join and 
                                                 
76
 U.S. Department of Labor’s 2011 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, Report Required by the 
Trade and Development Act of 2000, available from http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tda.htm 
[hereinafter 2011 TDA Report], p. 188. 
77
The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
78
 Ibid.  
79
 Sugar Industry June 2013 Report, p. 19.   
80
 Ibid.; The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012. 
81
 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 47.  The Spanish phrasing of article 47 is:  “Toda persona 
tiene derecho de asociarse con fines lícitos, de conformidad con la ley.”     
82
 Ibid, art. 48.  The Spanish phrasing of Article 48 is: “Toda persona tiene derecho de reunirse, sin 
permiso previo, con fines lícitos y pacíficos, de conformidad con la ley.” The 2011Inspection Protocol for 
Agriculture also cites internationally recognized labor rights when providing enforcement guidelines for 
labor inspectors who are inspecting for freedom of association-related violations.  Ministry of Labor, 
Agriculture Inspection Protocol. 
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participate in a union as one of workers’ basic rights.83  Further, employers are prohibited 
from interfering in the creation or administration of unions,
84
 and workers have a right to 
strike, if they do so in accordance with the law.
85
  The Labor Code defines “practices 
contrary to the freedom to join and participate in a union” as a very serious (muy grave) 
violation subject to fines of seven to 12 times the applicable minimum wage, the highest 
fine contained in the Code.
86
 
 
The 2008 General Inspection Protocol and the 2011 Inspection Protocol for Agriculture 
instruct inspectors to speak with both workers and employers to verify that employers are 
not restricting workers’ right to freely associate through the use of threats, firings, or 
other negative differential treatment towards workers who support, are affiliated with, or 
are active in unions or organizing efforts or through positive differential treatment 
towards workers who are not affiliated with or who oppose independent unions or 
organizing efforts.
87
  Despite clear recommendations in these Inspection Protocols, a 
review of the 14 reports on preventive inspections conducted in the sugar sector from 
2007 through February 2012 suggests that inspectors failed to ask workers or supervisors 
about any issues relating to freedom of association, the right to organize, union 
membership or activity, or collective bargaining.
88
 
                                                 
83
 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 62.3.  The Spanish phrasing of article 62.3 is: “Son 
derechos básicos de trabajadores y trabajadoras, entre otros: la libertad sindical, la seguridad social, la 
negociación colectiva….”  Labor Code, Principle XII.  The Spanish phrasing of Principle XII is: “Se 
reconocen como derechos básicos de los trabajadores, entre otros, la libertad sindical, el disfrute de un 
salario justo…” 
84
 Labor Code, art. 333.5.  The Spanish phrasing of article 333.5 is “Se reputará entre otras, prácticas 
desleales o contrarias a la ética profesional del trabajo: . . .  Intervenir en cualquier forma en la creación 
o administración de un sindicato de trabajadores o sostenerlo por medios financieros o de cualquier 
naturaleza.” 
85
 Ibid. at Libro 6, Titulo II; Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 62.6.  The Spanish phrasing of 
Article 62.6 is: “Para resolver conflictos laborales y pacíficos se reconoce el derecho de trabajadores a la 
huelga y de empleadores al paro de las empresas privadas, siempre que se ejerzan con arreglo a la ley, la 
cual dispondrá las medidas para garantizar el mantenimiento de los servicios públicos o los de utilidad 
pública.” 
86
 Labor Code, art. 720.3.  The Spanish phrasing of article 720 is: “Las violaciónes sujetas a sanciones 
penales, se clasifican en:…(3) Muy graves:…En materia de derechos colectivos, se reputa como muy 
grave, la comisión de prácticas desleales contrarias a la libertad sindical.”  Article 721 sets out the 
corresponding fines for each level of violation (leve, grave, and muy grave).  The Spanish phrasing of 
article 721 is:  “Las violaciónes que figuran en el artículo 720, son sancionadas del modo siguiente:…(3) 
Las muy graves, con multas de siete a doce salarios mínimos.”  See also Labor Code art. 333.2, prohibiting 
employers from penalizing employees for participating in union activities.  The Spanish phrasing of Article 
333.2 is: “Se reputará entre otras, prácticas desleales o contrarias a laética profesional del trabajo:. . . 
Ejercer represalias contra los trabajadores en razón de sus actividades sindicales.”   
87
 Ministry of Labor, General Inspection Protocol, pp. 38-39; Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection 
Protocol, pp. 12-14.   
88
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of December 18, 2007; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 159/2008, December 17, 2008; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 079/09, October 22, 2009; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/10, January 14, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 22, 2010; Government 
of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 31/10, January 26, 2010; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 28/10, February 1, 2010; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 41/10, February 8, 2010; Government of the 
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In addition to analyzing the 14 inspection reports produced by the Government of the 
Dominican Republic, the OTLA engaged in fact-finding to gather evidence related to the 
submission’s allegations regarding freedom of association.  In meetings with the OTLA 
and other U.S. government officials during the course of missions to the Dominican 
Republic in April and July 2012, executives of the three major sugar companies 
referenced in the submission asserted that each of the three companies has a union and 
that these unions have negotiated collective bargaining agreements on behalf of 
workers.
89
  However, in the one collective bargaining agreement provided to the OTLA, 
most of the provisions apply only to permanent workers, rather than “seasonal” migrant 
sugarcane cutters,
90
 and most workers interviewed during these missions told the OTLA 
that they did not know of any unions representing them.
91
  The few interviewed workers 
who knew of existing unions asserted that those unions appear not to represent their 
interests.
92
  During meetings with the OTLA, executives of two of the major sugar 
companies promised to send the OTLA information regarding the union leaders at each 
company, including whether they speak Creole.
93
  As of the date of this report and 
despite a second request to representatives of the sugar companies, the OTLA has not 
received the information. 
 
In addition, many of the interviewed workers expressed a general fear that they would be 
fired or otherwise punished if they attempted to organize formal or informal independent 
workers’ organizations and therefore do not try.94  Some workers reported having been 
directly threatened by their employers with firing or loss of housing if they were to meet 
with fellow co-workers, and others recounted the story of a group of co-workers being 
fired for attempting to “negotiate” with their employer.95 
 
Interviewed workers also told the OTLA that on March 23, 2012, the Ingenio Cristobal 
Colon fired 18 workers, for participating in a collective work stoppage to protest wages 
insufficient to cover food costs and failure to pay amounts due.
96
  The company has 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of March 2, 2010; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 16/10, March 9, 2010; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 109/2010, May 18, 2010; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 31, 2011; Government of the Dominican Republic, 
Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 23/10, January 31, 2011; Government of the Dominican Republic, 
Ministry of Labor, Inspection of February 29, 2012. 
89
 Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the three major sugar companies, April & July 2012.   
90
 Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convenio Colectivo de Condiciones de Trabajo) 2010-2013, provided 
to the OTLA by sugar executives on April 24, 2012.  
91
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012. 
92
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  For example, the OTLA interviewed a delegate 
in one of the unions who expressed frustration with the union and asserted that when he brings complaints 
to the union leadership on behalf of workers, the union does not pursue them.  The OTLA interviews with 
workers, July 2012.  
93
 Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the major sugar companies, San Pedro de Macorís and 
Barahona, July 2012.  
94
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
95
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012. 
96
 Ibid.; Wrongful termination lawsuits filed on behalf of 15 workers, Labor Court of the District Court of 
San Pedro de Macorís, April 18, 2012.  
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asserted that the work stoppage was unlawful and that it fired these workers for illegally 
“trying to prevent other workers from performing their duties, and making threats with 
machetes or cane knives.”97  On April 18, 2012, an attorney filed a wrongful termination 
lawsuit on behalf of these workers.
98
  On December 26, 2012, 15 of the 18 fired workers 
withdrew their claims;
99
 three of the original 18 workers continue to await a decision on 
their case from the regional Labor Court. 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related 
to the general allegations of employer interference in union activity and the specific 
allegation of retaliatory firing for work stoppage participation.  Based on its review, the 
OTLA has concerns regarding alleged violations of Dominican labor laws related to the 
right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively in the sugar sector.  
As provided under the relevant Inspection Protocols, all inspections conducted in the 
sector should verify that employers are not restricting workers’ right to freely associate.  
The Government of the Dominican Republic should identify any violations and, as 
appropriate, impose sanctions and ensure remediation. 
 
C. A minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor 
 
The Government of the Dominican Republic has a Strategic National Plan to Eradicate 
the Worst Forms of Child Labor (2006-2016) and a Roadmap Towards the Elimination of 
Child Labor in the Dominican Republic, which lays out a plan to eliminate the worst 
forms of child labor in the country by 2015 and all other types of child labor by 2020.
100
  
Although the Roadmap notes that at least one of the three main sugar companies has 
supported efforts to eliminate child labor, it does not appear that the government has a 
plan specifically to combat the worst forms of child labor in the sugar sector.
101
 
 
                                                 
97
 Communication on behalf of the Dominican Sugar Commission to the OTLA, July 18, 2012.   
98
 Wrongful termination lawsuits filed on behalf of 15 workers, Labor Court of the District Court of San 
Pedro de Macorís, April 18, 2012. 
99
 The submitter alleges that a supervisor at one of the sugar companies verbally offered these 15 workers 
reinstatement plus payment of back wages if they withdrew their claims.  As of the date of this report, these 
workers have not received the reinstatement or payment of back wages they were allegedly promised.  
Email from submitter to the OTLA, June 28, 2013; Phone conversation between the OTLA and submitter, 
June 28, 2013. 
100
Government of the Dominican Republic, Plan Estratégico Nacional para la erradicación de las peores 
formas de trabajo infantil en República Dominicana 2006-2016,  available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/FR20100224/DominicanRepublic/GovPrograms/DR_NationalStrate
gy_ChildLabor.pdf; Government of the Dominican Republic, Hoja de Ruta para hacer de República 
Dominicana un país libre de trabajo infantil y sus peores formas: Documento Estratégico, available from  
http://white.oit.org.pe/ipec/pagina.php?pagina=337 (last visited September 4, 2013) [hereinafter Roadmap 
Towards the Elimination of Child Labor in the Dominican Republic]. 
101
 Roadmap Towards the Elimination of Child Labor in the Dominican Republic, p. 88.  The Roadmap 
explicitly notes that the CAEI or the “Vicini Group” has supported such efforts.  Ibid. 
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The Dominican Constitution declares that the eradication of child labor is an issue of the 
highest importance to the nation.
102
  The Labor Code codifies a prohibition against child 
labor.  It establishes 14 as the minimum age for legal employment.
103
  Children under 16 
years of age cannot work more than six hours per day.
104
  The Labor Code permits 
children under 18 years of age to participate in light collection work in the agricultural 
sector,
105
 but Labor Resolution 52/2004 establishes that children under 18 years of age 
are prohibited from participating in dangerous and unhealthy work, including planting, 
cutting, carrying, or lifting sugarcane or handling the bagasse.
106
  This same Labor 
Resolution states that violations of this prohibition are to be treated as very serious 
violations subject to fines of seven to 12 times the minimum wage under the Labor 
Code.
107
 
 
According to the Ministry of Labor’s 2008 General Inspection Protocol and 2011 
Inspection Protocol for Agriculture, inspectors are to speak with both workers and 
employers to verify that no children under 14 years of age are employed, that the 
workday for children does not exceed that established by law (including that children 
under 16 are not working more than six hours per day), that children are only working in 
light collection work, and that the employer is not misrepresenting prohibited work as 
light collection work.
108
 
 
Employers asserted in meetings with the OTLA that they prohibit child labor and that 
child labor does not exist on their plantations.
109
  Many interviewed workers corroborated 
that this is the official policy at the major sugar companies.
110
  However, many workers 
                                                 
102
 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 56.1  The Spanish phrasing of Article 56.1 is “Se declara 
del más alto interés nacional la erradicación del trabajo infantil y todo tipo de maltrato o violencia contra 
las personas menores de edad.  Los niños, niñas y adolescentes serán protegidos por el Estado contra toda 
forma de abandono, secuestro, estado de vulnerabilidad, abuso o violencia física, sicológica, moral o 
sexual, explotación comercial, laboral, económica y trabajos riesgosos.” 
103
 Labor Code, art. 245.  The Spanish phrasing of article 245 is: “Se prohíbe el trabajo de menores de 
catorce años.”  
104
 Ibid., art. 247.  The Spanish phrasing of article 247 is: “La jornada de trabajo de los menores de 
dieciséis años no puede exceder, en ninguna circunstancia, de seis horas diarias.”  
105
 Ibid., art. 282.  The Spanish phrasing of article 282 is: “Las disposiciones concernientes al trabajo de 
los menores no se aplican cuando éstos se utilicen en el campo en trabajos ligeros de recolección.” 
106
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Resolution No. 52/2004 About Dangerous 
and Unhealthy Work for Persons Under 18 Years of Age (Resolución No. 52/2004 Sobre Trabajos 
Peligrosos e Insalubres para Personas Menores de 18 Años), August 13, 2004, available from 
http://www.ministeriodetrabajo.gob.do/documentospdf/TrabajoInfantil/resolucion%2052-2004.pdf (last 
visited September 4, 2013), art. 2.25.  The Spanish phrasing of article 2.25 is: “Se prohibe la participación 
de personas menores de 18 años en los siguientes trabajos y tareas…25) Siembra, corte, acarreo y alza de 
la caña de azúcar y manipulación del bagazo de la caña.”  “Bagasse” is defined as the plant residue (as of 
sugarcane or grapes) left after a product (as juice) has been extracted.  Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
available from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bagasse (last visited September 4, 2013).  
107
 Ibid., art. 6.  The Spanish phrasing of article 6 is: “Las violaciones en contra de la presente Resolución 
serán consideras como faltas muy graves y en consecuencia conllevarán las sanciones establecidas al 
efecto en el artículo No. 721 del Código de Trabajo (Ley 16-92).”  
108
 Ministry of Labor, General Inspection Protocol, pp. 37-38; Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection 
Protocol, p. 8. 
109
 Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the three major sugar companies, April & July 2012.  
110
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
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who spoke with the OTLA also reported that they observed children performing tasks in 
sugarcane that are prohibited by Labor Resolution 52/2004 for children under 18, such as 
cutting or collecting cane, planting seeds, or clearing fields.
111
  Some workers also 
reported seeing children cutting sugarcane, in one case appearing as young as 12, also in 
contravention of the law.
112
  One worker stated, “Yes, child labor still exists here.  They 
plant and cut sugarcane.  Some appear to be 15 years old; some look as young as 12 years 
old.”113  Some workers further reported that children work with the knowledge of 
company supervisors,
114
 with one worker stating, “Children still cut sugarcane here.  I 
have seen about 10 of them, aged 15 to 16, that work full days cutting sugarcane, and the 
supervisors know about it.”115 
 
In addition to the information collected by the OTLA delegation detailed above, a 2012 
independent study by Verité, which surveyed 740 sugar sector workers between June and 
August 2010 and included both individual cases and sector-wide analysis of the sugar 
industry, found 12 cases of child labor in the sugar sector.
116
  These cases included a 
nine-year-old child who was paid to help his father and other sugarcane cutters harvest 
sugarcane during non-school hours and adolescents between the ages of 15 and 17 
planting and cutting sugarcane.  Two recent U.S. Department of Labor reports also find 
that child labor occurs in the Dominican sugar sector.  The Department of Labor’s 2012 
List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor lists Dominican sugarcane as a 
good produced by child labor.
117
  The Department of Labor’s 2011 Findings on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labor notes that according to a 2011 report from the ILO Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, children work in 
Dominican sugarcane plantations alongside their parents, which may involve collecting 
cut cane or clearing land, and that these children risk injury from carrying heavy loads, 
using dangerous tools, and getting cut by the plants.
118
  Similarly, the 2012 U.S. 
                                                 
111
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
112
 Ibid.   
113
 The OTLA interviews with workers, July 2012. 
114
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012. 
115
 Ibid.   
116
 Verité, Research Into Indicators of Forced Labor in the Supply Chain of the Dominican Republic, 2012, 
available from 
http://www.verite.org/sites/default/files/images/Research%20on%20Indicators%20of%20Forced%20Labor
%20in%20the%20Dominican%20Republic%20Sugar%20Sector_9.18.pdf  (last visited September 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter 2012 Verité Report], pp. 78 – 80.  Verité’s report states that its “report is based on research on 
the presence of indicators of forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector.  This research was not intended to 
determine the existence or scale of forced labor in the countries and sectors under study, but rather to 
identify the presence of indicators of forced labor and factors that increased workers’ vulnerability to labor 
exploitation.”  Ibid, p. 7. 
117
 U.S. Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, Report Required 
by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, 2012, p. 18, available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tvpra.htm (last visited June 19, 2013) [hereinafter 2012 TVPRA 
Report], p. 18.   
118
 2011 TDA Report, p. 188.  For this information, the 2011 TDA Report cites ILO Committee of Experts. 
Individual Observation concerning Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) Dominican Republic 
(ratification: 1999), November 21, 2011, available from http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=12535&chapter=6&query= (last visited 
September 4, 2013); International Trade Union Confederation, Internationally Recognised Core Labour 
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Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices reports allegations of 
children working in the production of Dominican sugarcane.
119
 
 
A lack of birth certificates among many vulnerable children and adolescents complicates 
efforts to verify the age of some young workers, hindering enforcement of child labor 
laws.  One employer stated that since many young workers in the sector lack birth 
documentation, employers assess their ages by how old they appear, preventing 
employers from being able to guarantee that children under 18 are not participating in 
dangerous and unhealthy work.
120
  Some interviewed workers told the OTLA that 
although management does not allow children under 18 to work, sometimes 15-17 year-
olds will pretend to be over age 18 to get work.
121
 
 
The 2010 Constitution stipulates that children born in the Dominican Republic receive 
Dominican citizenship at birth if one of their parents is a Dominican citizen.
122
  The 2010 
Constitution denies Dominican citizenship at birth to children born on Dominican soil to 
parents who are “in transit” or who reside illegally in the Dominican Republic.123  The 
Constitution adopted the 2004 Migration Law’s definition of “in transit” as covering 
anyone in the Dominican Republic without resident status.
124
  On December 1, 2011, the 
Dominican Supreme Court upheld the Central Electoral Board’s Circular 17, which 
instructs Civil Registry officials to deny Dominican birth certificates to children of 
parents who lack resident status, including those who are “in transit.”125  As a result, all 
                                                                                                                                                 
Standards in the Dominican Republic: Report for the WTO General Council Review of the Trade Policies 
of the Dominican Republic, Geneva,November 2008; Johns J. "CNN Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: 
Invisible Chains: Sex, Work and Slavery [transcript]," February 16, 2007 [cited February 21, 2012], 
available from http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/16/acd.02.html (last visited September 4, 
2013); U.S. Embassy – Santo Domingo, reporting, June 4, 2008.  See also CSCC - Responsible Sourcing 
Solutions, Dominican Sugar: A Macro View of Today’s Industry, 2009, available from: 
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/citizenship/pdf/DominicanSugarIndustry-AMacroLevelReport.pdf 
(last visited September 4, 2013). 
119
 2012 State Department Human Rights Report.   
120
 Meetings between the OTLA and sugar executives, Santo Domingo, April 23, 2012; CAEI Response, 
July 9, 2012, p. 10 (stating that, “When a potential worker does not have personal documents the age is 
estimated by look appreciation.  A worker that looks underage will not be registered, even if he states to 
have the minimum age of 18”).  
121
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012.  A recent industry report notes that the use of 
biometrics systems prevents any unauthorized or underage individuals from working, but it fails to explain 
how the systems could help verify the age of workers without identity documents.  Sugar Industry June 
2013 Report, pp. 11-13. 
122
 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 18.  The Spanish phrasing of article 18 is:  “Nacionalidad.  
Son dominicanas y dominicanos: (1) Los hijos e hijas de madre o padre dominicanos…(3) Las personas 
nacidas en territorio nacional, con excepción de los hijos e hijas de extranjeros miembros de legaciones 
diplomáticas y consulares, de extranjeros que se hallen en tránsito o residen ilegalmente en territorio 
dominicano.  Se considera persona en tránsito a toda extranjera o extranjero definido como tal en las leyes 
dominicanas…” 
123
 Ibid. 
124
 Ibid. 
125
 See, e.g., Dominican Today, “Supreme Court upholds Denial of Nationality to Descendant of Haitians ,” 
December 1, 2011, available from http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2011/12/1/41827/Supreme-
Court-upholds-denial-of-nationality-to-descendant-of-Haitians (last visited September 4, 2013); Dominican 
Today, “NGOs Slam Ruling denies Citizenship to Children of Haitian Ancestry,” December 2, 2011, 
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those born on Dominican soil to parents without resident status are not entitled to 
Dominican birth certificates.
126
  Furthermore, many such children also cannot obtain birth 
certificates from their parents’ countries of origin or face virtually insurmountable 
obstacles to doing so, particularly if their parents are no longer citizens of other countries 
or have lost ties with their countries of origin as a result of their long-established 
presence in the Dominican Republic.
127
 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related 
to child labor in the Dominican sugar sector, including: workers’ statements that they 
have seen children cutting or collecting sugarcane, planting seeds, or clearing fields and 
have observed children, in one case appearing as young as 12, cutting sugarcane;  the 
above-referenced 2010 constitutional amendment; findings of child labor by the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s 2011 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor and 2012 List 
of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; the 2011 U.S. Department of 
State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices for the Dominican Republic; the 2012 
Verité report, Research Into Indicators of Forced Labor in the Supply Chain of the 
Dominican Republic; and statements and information provided by the Government of the 
Dominican Republic and representatives of the sugar companies, including the June 2013 
report by the Dominican sugar industry and evidence that employers often assess young 
undocumented workers’ ages based on appearance.  Based on this review, the OTLA has 
found sufficient evidence of apparent and potential violations of the labor laws of the 
Dominican Republic related to child labor in the sugar sector to warrant further 
Government inspection and, as appropriate, sanction and remediation. 
 
D. A prohibition on any form of forced or compulsory labor 
 
The Constitution of the Dominican Republic bans all forms of slavery, servitude, and 
trafficking in persons.
128
  Both the Constitution and the Labor Code also prohibit anyone 
from forcing anyone else to work against his or her will.
129
 
 
As discussed in prior sections, the Ministry of Labor’s 2008 General Inspection Protocol 
and 2011 Inspection Protocol for Agriculture provide enforcement guidelines for labor 
inspectors applying Dominican labor laws.
130
  For forced labor, the Inspection Protocols 
                                                                                                                                                 
available from  http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2011/12/2/41840/NGOs-slam-ruling-denies-
citizenship-to-children-of-Haitian-ancestry (last visited September 4, 2013). 
126
 Law 285-04 on Migration, art. 36.10. The Spanish phrasing of article 36.10  is: “Los no residentes son 
considerados personas en transito;” U.S. Department of State official, e-mail communication to U. S. 
Department of  Labor official, May 29, 2012.  
127
 2012 State Department Human Rights Report. 
128
 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 41.  The Spanish phrasing of article 41 is: “Se prohíben en 
todas sus formas, la esclavitud, la servidumbre, la trata y el tráfico de personas.”  
129
 Ibid., art. 62.2; Labor Code, Principle II.  Article 62.2 of the Constitution and Principle II of the Labor 
Code both contain the same language.  The Spanish phrasing of this language is: “Nadie puede impedir el 
trabajo de los demás ni obligarles a trabajar contra su voluntad.”  
130
 Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection Protocol.  The inspection protocol lists the “Legal Standards” 
(“Norma Legal” in Spanish) that inspectors are to apply for each labor right (“Tema Laboral” in Spanish) 
covered by the protocol.  
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identify situations that may be indicative of forced labor and incorporate the Constitution, 
the Labor Code, and ILO Convention No. 29 as applicable legal standards.
131
 
 
Convention No. 29 defines forced labor as “all work or service which is exacted from any 
person under the menace of penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily.”132  The following sections analyze labor conditions in the Dominican sugar 
sector under the framework provided by Convention No. 29, as directly incorporated into 
the 2011 Inspection Protocol for Agriculture.  The analysis also considers the particular 
vulnerabilities of the workers in the sugar sector as directly related to the application of 
the definition of forced labor, including whether a particular worker is in a position to 
decline the required work.  The same overlapping conditions and employer actions may 
be indicative of involuntariness, menace of penalty, and workers’ vulnerability to forced 
labor. 
 
The OTLA delegation found many workers in situations that indicate forced overtime.  
Many interviewed workers work 12 hours or more per day, exceeding the 10-hour legal 
limit for agriculture, and seven days per week, including on government holidays, despite 
the mandatory 36-hour weekly rest period and the requirement of paid holidays off.
133
  
Employers stressed to the OTLA that workers are free to stop working or take days off 
whenever they want.
134
  Nonetheless, while some workers suggested to the OTLA that, at 
times, they choose to work hours in excess of the legal limit for economic reasons, 
several workers reported feeling compelled to work illegal overtime in response to 
supervisors’ threats to fire them if they do not come to work every day, or if they refuse 
to complete or protest the long schedule.
135
  For example, one worker told the delegation, 
“If we leave early [and don’t work the full day from 6:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m.], the boss gets 
angry.  They threaten us with losing our jobs.  If you lose your job and stay in the house, 
you won’t eat.”136  Another worker told the delegation, “The sugarcane cutters have to 
finish their work before they can leave.  The boss tells us we have to stay until it is 
                                                 
131
 Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection Protocol, pp. 9-10.  The Dominican Republic ratified 
Convention No. 29 on December 5, 1956.  International Labor Organization, Ratifications of C029 – 
Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), available from 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312174 
(last visited September 4, 2013).  
132
 International Labor Organization, Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, Forced Labor 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), art. 2.1., available from 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029 (last visited 
September 4, 2013).  This definition of forced labor was reiterated by the former Minister of Labor of the 
Dominican Republic, Francisco Domínguez Brito, when he explained the ILO’s definition of forced labor 
as, “todo trabajo o servicio exigido a un individuo bajo la amenaza de una pena cualquiera y para el cual 
dicho individuo no se ofrece voluntariamente.”  Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of 
Labor, Minister of Labor says no forced labor exists in the Dominican Republic (Ministro de Trabajo 
afirma no existe trabajo forzoso en República Dominicana), April 27, 2012, available from 
http://www.ministeriodetrabajo.gob.do/index.php/todas-las-noticias/343-ministro-de-trabajo-afirma-no-
existe-trabajo-forzoso-en-republica-dominicana (last visited September 4, 2013).  
133
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.   
134
 Meetings between the OTLA and executives of the three major sugar companies, April & July 2012.  
135
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  Workers told the OTLA delegation that they 
work every day, including during the weekly rest period, because, “if you don’t work, you get fired.”  Ibid.     
136
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.   
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finished.” 137  One worker said he was fired for asking to amend his schedule from 12 to 
10 hours per day so that he could study in the evenings.  He provided the OTLA 
delegation with a signed notice of termination that supported his statement.
138
  Such 
threats and the resulting overtime in excess of the legal limit are indicative of forced 
labor. 
 
Some interviewed workers also told the OTLA delegation that although they voluntarily 
migrated to the Dominican Republic, they were victims of deceptive recruiting and 
subsequently entered into employment other than that which they originally expected.  
Many workers reported having been deceived about the type of work in which they 
would be engaged and the conditions of their employment in the Dominican Republic.
139
  
For example, some workers were told they would be employed in jobs other than cutting 
sugarcane, such as picking tomatoes, doing construction, or working in offices;
140
 and 
some were promised higher pay than they actually received.
141
  Each of these deceptive 
recruitment practices is indicative of forced labor. 
 
Sugar sector workers also described various impediments to formally complaining to 
employers or to the Ministry of Labor about unacceptable terms and conditions of 
employment and other labor law violations.  Some interviewed workers stated that they 
had been explicitly told by employers that they have no rights and cannot file 
complaints.
142
  Others explained that the fear of being deported or reported to 
immigration authorities or of being fired prevents them from formally complaining.
143
  In 
one case where 15 workers participated in a collective work stoppage to protest perceived 
irregularities in their payment system, their employer called immigration authorities to 
disperse them, spurring the workers to flee.
144
  All 15 workers were subsequently fired 
and none received payments they were legally due.
145
  Similarly, workers who met with 
the OTLA delegation reported that they felt the need to sneak out of their housing in the 
bateyes to meet with the delegation, fearing that they might be detected and face 
repercussions for speaking with the OTLA.
146
  As discussed in Section E, two workers 
reported being fired in retaliation for speaking with the OTLA delegation during its April 
2012 mission to the Dominican Republic.  Depriving workers of the ability to seek legal 
enforcement of their rights can contribute to worker isolation, disempowerment, and a 
culture of fear and employer control that makes workers particularly vulnerable to forced 
labor. 
                                                 
137
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.   
138
 The OTLA interviews with workers, July 2012.   
139
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
140
 Ibid.  Reportedly, other sugarcane workers were told by the persons who transported them to the sugar 
plantations (buscones) that they would be working in hotels.  AFL-CIO, Response to Request for Comments 
on Article 156.4.3 of the DR-CAFTA, July 2, 2012.   
141
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
142
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012.  For example, a worker told the OTLA, “We cannot 
complain to our supervisor.  The supervisors say that we have no rights to complain because we are 
‘congos’ [from Haiti].  If we are in a bad situation, it stays that way.”  Ibid.    
143
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
144
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012. 
145
 Ibid.; Phone conversation between the OTLA and local contact, November 9, 2012. 
146
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012. 
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Some of the undocumented migrant workers interviewed by the OTLA also reported that 
they fear being deported or denounced to Dominican immigration authorities if they quit 
their jobs and leave the bateyes.
147
  The Ministry of Labor’s 2011 Inspection Protocol for 
Agriculture highlights the extra vulnerability of undocumented workers, noting that a 
lack of documentation can limit workers’ mobility.148  This, especially when combined 
with workers’ fear of formally complaining about unlawful employment conditions and 
other labor law violations, increases workers’ vulnerability to forced labor. 
 
Additionally, interviewed workers stated, and sugar company executives confirmed, that 
workers must remain in the bateyes during the non-harvest season or return to the bateyes 
for the following year’s harvest to receive their legally-mandated Christmas bonuses, due 
by December 20,
149
 and profit-sharing bonuses, due 90 to 120 days after the harvest 
season ends.
150
  An executive of one of the major sugar companies explained that his 
                                                 
147
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012.  For example, a worker told the OTLA that, “We are 
afraid to go out on the highway.  We run and hide for fear of immigration.”  Ibid.  2012 State Department 
Human Rights Report (stating that, “Many batey residents, lacking documentation, felt they had little 
choice but to remain in their communities, where they felt relatively safe from the risks of deportation and 
harassment that existed elsewhere in the country”).   
148
 Under the heading of “Possible Problematic Areas” that labor inspectors are to consider with regard to 
inspections into forced labor, the Protocol states, “A lack of documentation can make workers’ mobility 
difficult” (“Falta de documentación puede dificultar la movilidad de los trabajadores”).  Ministry of 
Labor, Agriculture Inspection Protocol, p. 10.  In 2011, the ILO requested that the Government of the 
Dominican Republic reply to allegations that this lack of documentation made migrant workers more 
vulnerable to forced labor.  In 2012, the ILO noted with regret that the Dominican government had not 
responded to this request.  ILO, Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, Direct Request (CEACR) – adopted 2011, published 101st ILC session (2012), Forced 
Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) – Dominican Republic (Ratification: 1956), available from 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2698151 (last 
visited September 4, 2013).  
149
 Labor Code, arts. 219 and 220.  The Spanish phrasing of article 219 is: “El empleador está obligado a 
pagar al trabajador en el mes de diciembre, el salario de navidad, consistente en la duodécima parte del 
salario ordinario devengado por el trabajador en el año calendario, sin perjuicio de los usos y prácticas 
de la empresa, lo pactado en el convenio colectivo o el derecho del empleador de otorgar por concepto de 
éste una suma mayor.  Sin embargo, en ningún caso el salario de navidad será mayor del monto de cinco 
salarios mínimos legalmente establecido.  Para el pago de este salario se excluyen las retribuciones por 
horas extraordinarias y el salario correspondiente a la participación en los beneficios de la empresa.  El 
salario de navidad no será computado para los fines del preaviso, de la cesantía y de la asistencia 
económica prevista en este Código.”  The Spanish phrasing of article 220 is:  “El pago del salario de 
navidad se hará a más tardar el día veinte del mes de diciembre aunque el contrato de trabajo se hubiere 
resuelto con anterioridad y sin tener en cuenta la causa de la resolución.  El trabajador que no haya 
prestado servicios durante todo el año tiene derecho al salario de navidad en proporción al tiempo 
trabajado durante el año.”     
150
 Ibid., arts. 223, 30, and 224.  The Spanish phrasing of article 223 is: “Es obligatorio para toda empresa 
otorgar una participación equivalente al diez por ciento de las utilidades o beneficios netos anuales a 
todos sus trabajadores por tiempo indefinido.  La participación individual de cada trabajador no podrá 
exceder del equivalente a cuarenta y cinco días de salario ordinario para aquellos que hayan prestado 
servicios por menos de tres años y de sesenta días de salario ordinario para los que hayan prestado 
servicio durante tres o más años.  Cuando el trabajador no preste servicios durante todo el año que 
corresponde al ejercicio económico, la participación individual será proporcional al salario del tiempo 
trabajado.”  The Spanish phrasing of article 30 is: “Los contratos estacionales de la industria azucarera, 
se reputan contratos de trabajo por tiempo indefinido sujetos a las reglas establecidas para éstos en caso 
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company pays the Christmas bonus at the beginning of the following harvest season 
(typically near the end of November or early December) and the profit-sharing bonus 
after the fiscal year ends in September.
151
  Some of the interviewed workers similarly told 
the OTLA that they receive their Christmas bonuses in December, at least one week after 
the subsequent harvest season has commenced.
152
  A local contact reported, however, that 
in 2012, workers at another one of the major sugar companies did not receive their 
Christmas bonuses until January 2013, almost two months into the subsequent harvest 
season.
153
 
 
Some interviewed workers reported that they leave the bateyes and return for their 
bonuses later in the year.  Others told the OTLA, however, that they must stay because, 
without their bonuses, they cannot afford the trip home, generally back to Haiti.
154
  Those 
workers who remain often perform additional work during the non-harvest season.  When 
the subsequent harvest season begins, if these workers have not yet received their 
Christmas bonuses and still remain in the bateyes, as occurred in at least some cases for 
the 2012 harvest, they begin working that harvest as they await their bonuses.  Having 
commenced the subsequent harvest season, they once again face the conditions, described 
in the paragraphs above, in which they fear reporting unlawful conditions or quitting their 
jobs and leaving the bateyes.
155
  This cycle further exacerbates workers’ vulnerability to 
forced labor. 
 
Many interviewed workers also reported purchasing food and other staple products at 
privately-owned stores, or colmados, located within their bateyes.
156
  Because many 
bateyes are isolated, these colmados are often the sole sources of food and other 
provisions available to workers living in bateyes.  Some interviewed workers reported 
that colmados typically inflate the prices of their goods, forcing workers, in some cases, 
to purchase food and other goods on credit, as the workers do not have sufficient money 
to pay upfront.
157
  Colmados charge high interest rates for the privilege of purchasing 
goods on credit, however, and as a result, workers’ debts to colmados can quickly balloon 
over the course of a harvest season.
158
  One worker reported that a colmado owner 
threatened to “take his house away” to collect payment; another reported having to sell all 
of his possessions, “even his shoes,” in order to pay his debt to the local colmado.159  
                                                                                                                                                 
de desahucio, salvo disposición contraria de la ley o del convenio colectivo.  Los períodos de prestación 
del servicio, correspondientes a varias zafras o temporadas consecutivas, se acumularán para la 
determinación de los derechos del trabajador.”  The Spanish phrasing of article 224 is: “El pago de la 
participación a los trabajadores será efectuado por las empresas a más tardar entre los noventa y los 
ciento veinte días después del cierre de cada ejercicio económico.  La participación de que trata el 
presente título goza de los mismos privilegios, garantías y exenciones que el salario.”    
151 Meeting between the OTLA and sugar executives, San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic, July 23, 
2012. 
152
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012. 
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 Phone conversation between the OTLA and local contact, January 31, 2013.  
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 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012.  
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 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012. 
156
 Ibid. 
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 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012 
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 Ibid.  
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Another worker told the OTLA that “we can never get out of debt” and that “sometimes 
we have to hide from the colmado owner.”160  The cycle of indebtedness engendered by 
the colmado system further limits the money that some Haitian migrant workers have 
available for transportation out of the bateyes and back to Haiti, thereby limiting their 
ability to leave the bateyes, even between harvest seasons.  It thus negatively affects 
workers’ mobility and adds to their vulnerability to forced labor. 
 
Sugar sector workers’ experiences often reflect a combination of some or all of the 
above-described conditions that are tantamount to forced labor and factors that increase 
workers’ vulnerability to forced labor.  “Patrice’s” experience, as he recounted it to the 
OTLA delegation in April 2012, is representative of this on-the-ground reality that 
workers may face in the sector.
161
  Patrice told the OTLA that he came to the Dominican 
Republic from Haiti, without legal documents, in 2003.  Since that time, he has worked 
as a sugarcane cutter, living in a batey that lacks electricity and other basic services.  
Normally, Patrice works from 4:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., seven days per week.  His 
supervisor tells him that he cannot leave his worksite until his daily work is finished, 
which generally takes 15 or more hours.  According to Patrice, despite his long hours, he 
does not earn enough money cutting sugarcane to afford food and relies on remittances to 
survive.  “I am in a situation that is the opposite of what I thought,” he told the OTLA.  
“Instead of sending money home to support my mom in Haiti, she has to send me money 
so that I can eat.”  Patrice would leave the Dominican Republic if he could afford the trip 
back home to Haiti, but he cannot.  He does not complain to management about his 
situation, because if workers complain, “the bosses can take away their jobs.  Many 
people have lost their jobs this way.”  In addition, as an undocumented migrant, he is also 
afraid to alert the Government of the Dominican Republic to his plight.  “Last year 
immigration came, and we had to hide.  They lit the cane fields on fire to try to get us to 
run out, so we had to run.  This is a technique that immigration officials often use.”162 
 
In addition to the information collected by the OTLA delegation detailed above, the 
independent 2012 Verité study referenced above also found multiple indicators of forced 
labor in the sector.  The Verité study identified a number of indicators of forced labor and 
of vulnerability to forced labor, similar to those found in the OTLA interviews, including: 
hours in excess of legal limits and a lack of days off; subminimum wage payments and 
illegal deductions for safety equipment and IDSS contributions; vulnerability to 
withholding or non-payment of wages, due to lack of written employment contracts; 
deception or false promises about terms and conditions of work; deportation or threats of 
deportation and dismissal or threats of dismissal for complaining about terms and 
conditions of employment; and “induced indebtedness” to colmados.  The study also 
noted additional indicators of forced labor and of vulnerability to forced labor, including: 
psychological compulsion to obey supervisors’ orders to work, resulting from “a credible 
threat of a penalty for non-compliance”; physical confinement in work locations, 
including isolation in remote bateyes and limited “authorized zones” in which workers 
                                                 
160
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April 2012.  
161
 “Patrice” is not the worker’s real name, but all other information in this narrative was reported directly 
to the OTLA delegation. Ibid.  
162
 Ibid. 
 23 
 
must remain; employer retention of identity documents, specifically temporary worker 
cards or carnets; induced indebtedness for costs related to the buscones, who recruit and 
transport workers to the sugar plantations; the use of a voucher system to make payments 
to colmados, with voucher values artificially deflated; loss of employer-provided housing 
or threats of such loss for failure to report to work for one or more days; exclusion from 
future employment or threats of such exclusion for complaining about unlawful working 
conditions, missing work, or quitting employment and leaving the bateyes; and physical 
violence or threats of physical violence for quitting work and leaving the bateyes.
163
 
 
Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2012 List of Goods Produced by Child 
Labor or Forced Labor lists Dominican sugarcane as a good produced by forced labor.
164
  
Sugarcane has been on the list since the report’s first publication in 2009.165 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of the information obtained related 
to forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector, including worker reports of unlawful 
overtime under the threat of dismissal, deceptive recruitment practices, fear of dismissal 
or deportation for formally complaining about unlawful labor conditions, fear of 
deportation for quitting work and leaving the bateyes, a bonus payment system that 
creates pressure for workers to return to work each season or remain on the bateyes year-
round, and growing indebtedness to local privately-owned colmados.  In addition, this 
review included statements by employers, as well as reports by the U.S. Department of 
Labor, independent organizations, and the sugar industry.  Based on this review, the 
OTLA has found sufficient evidence of apparent and potential violations of the labor 
laws of the Dominican Republic related to forced labor and to indicators of forced labor 
in the sugar sector to warrant further Government inspection and, as appropriate, sanction 
and remediation. 
 
E. Post-OTLA mission reprisals against workers  
 
Prior to the OTLA’s first fact-finding trip to the Dominican Republic in April 2012, the 
OTLA received an allegation that certain employers were threatening workers with 
reprisals, including firings, if they spoke with the OTLA delegation.
166
 
 
Due to the seriousness of the allegation, the OTLA raised this concern with the 
Government of the Dominican Republic and sugar company executives at two of the 
three major sugar companies in meetings on April 23 and 24, noting that if such 
                                                 
163
 2012 Verité Report, p. 80.  Verité’s report states that its “report is based on research on the presence of 
indicators of forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector. This research was not intended to determine the 
existence or scale of forced labor in the countries and sectors under study, but rather to identify the 
presence of indicators of forced labor and factors that increased workers’ vulnerability to labor 
exploitation.”  Ibid., p. 7.   
164
 2012 TVPRA Report, p. 18.   
165
 U.S. Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, Report Required 
by the Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2005, 2009, available from 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tvpra.htm, p. 27. 
166
 Email from the submitter to the OTLA, April 23, 2012.   
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allegations were true and any such reprisals were to occur, they could be seen as attempts 
to undermine this review process.
167
  Officials of the Government of the Dominican 
Republic stated that they would investigate any specific allegations of such threats or 
reprisals, and sugar executives assured the OTLA that there had been no threats of 
reprisals against workers and would be no such threats or reprisals in the future.
168
 
 
Nevertheless, shortly after meeting with workers during its April 2012 trip, the OTLA 
received specific allegations of reprisals against those workers.
169
  On Saturday, April 28, 
the OTLA met with sugarcane workers in both a group setting and individually.  Then on 
May 2, the OTLA was informed that two of the workers with whom the delegation met 
individually had been fired on Sunday, April 29, less than 24 hours after meeting with the 
OTLA.
170
  The workers stated that they were fired as a result of speaking with the 
delegation.
171
 
 
On May 7, the OTLA informed the Government of the Dominican Republic of these 
reported reprisals without identifying the two workers by name.
172
  Ministry of Labor 
inspectors investigated the matter on May 9 and June 6, speaking with a total of four 
workers and eight managers during the investigation.
173
  The Ministry sent the OTLA a 
summary of these inspections on June 21 and shared the specific inspection reports with 
the OTLA on July 24.
174
  The May 9 inspection report finds, based on a statement by the 
company’s Human Resources Director, that one of the workers had been suspended for 
causing a disturbance in a meeting with the local Haitian consul, but that this worker had 
been reinstated after one day and received compensatory pay for the day of work 
missed.
175
  However, the June 6 inspection report contains a statement from the same 
worker that he “was suspended for speaking ill of the company to the commission that 
                                                 
167
 Meeting between the OTLA and the Dominican Ministries of Labor and Foreign Affairs, Santo 
Domingo, April 23, 2012; Meeting between the OTLA and sugar executives, Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic, April 23-24, 2012.  
168
 Meeting between the OTLA and the Dominican Ministries of Labor and Foreign Affairs, Santo 
Domingo, April 23, 2012; Meeting between the OTLA and sugar executives, Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic, April 23-24, 2012.  A representative of the sugar companies also agreed, stating that any such 
reprisals against workers would be a very serious situation, tantamount to “witness tampering.”  Meeting 
between the OTLA and an attorney for the Dominican sugar sector, Washington, D.C., June 7, 2012. 
169
 Email from local contact to the OTLA, May 2, 2012.  The alleged reprisals occurred against workers 
employed by the one sugar company with whose executives the OTLA delegation did not meet during the 
April 2012 trip.    
170
 Ibid.  The local contact alerted the OTLA to these alleged reprisals in an email on May 2, 2012, and 
then, during a phone call with the OTLA on May 3, provided clarifying information, including the names 
of the fired workers and the allegations that they were fired for speaking against the company in a meeting. 
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 Ibid.; The OTLA interviews with workers, July 2012; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry 
of Labor, Inspection No. 190, June 6, 2012.  
172
 Email from the OTLA to the Government of the Dominican Republic, May 7, 2012.  The OTLA also 
met with representatives of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic in Washington, D.C., to discuss this 
matter on May 7, 2012.  
173
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 176, May 9, 2012; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 190, June 6, 2012.   
174
 Letter sent to the OTLA by the Ministry of Labor of the Dominican Republic regarding inspections into 
alleged post-OTLA mission reprisals against workers, June 21, 2012; Meeting between the OTLA and the 
Ministry of Labor, Barahona, Dominican Republic, July 24, 2012.  
175
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 176, May 9, 2012.  
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visited from the United States.”176  The June 21 letter from the Government of the 
Dominican Republic to the OTLA cites the Human Resources Director’s statement from 
May 9 without referencing the worker’s statement on June 6.177 
 
During the OTLA’s July trip, the OTLA delegation spoke with the local Haitian consul 
mentioned in the May 9 inspection report.  He stated that the only in-person engagement 
he had with workers on or about April 29 was during a Labor Day party hosted by the 
sugar company on the afternoon of Monday, April 30, during which there had been no 
disturbances or other incidents involving workers in his presence.
178
  The Haitian consul 
showed the OTLA delegation a video taken during the party.
179
 
 
The May 9 and June 6 inspection reports do not mention the second worker allegedly 
fired for speaking with the OTLA.  On September 12, the OTLA provided the Ministry of 
Labor with the name of the second allegedly fired worker, after receiving his permission 
to do so.
180
  The OTLA also alerted the Ministry of Labor to several issues raised by the 
labor inspectors’ investigation into the matter, including that the inspectors spoke with 
few workers, conducted the inspection in Spanish rather than Creole, and failed to 
ascertain the identity of the second fired worker.
181
  The Ministry of Labor investigated 
this matter as it relates to the second worker on October 12 and sent the OTLA a copy of 
the inspection report on November 22.
182
  This inspection report contains a statement by 
the worker that he was never fired,
183
 despite his assertion to the contrary to the OTLA 
during a meeting in July.
184
  The inspection report also notes that the worker’s statement 
was made in the presence of two supervisors.
185
  The OTLA has been informed that one 
of these is the same supervisor who allegedly fired the worker.
186
  In addition to the 
October 12 inspection report, on November 22, the Government of the Dominican 
Republic also sent the OTLA copies of what appear to be payroll records intended to 
show that this second worker was never fired.
187
  The OTLA has been unable to verify 
the information contained in these records. 
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 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 190, June 6, 2012.  The 
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The OTLA has received information that both workers allegedly fired as a result of 
speaking with the OTLA delegation are now re-employed with their company.
188
 
 
F. Government enforcement of labor laws 
 
The Labor Code of the Dominican Republic tasks the Ministry of Labor’s inspectorate 
with overseeing compliance with labor laws,
189
 including through worksite inspections.  
The Labor Code authorizes labor inspectors to enter worksites freely and without prior 
notification, interview company personnel, and request and review employer records and 
documentation.
190
  If labor inspectors identify a labor law violation during the inspection 
process, they must communicate the finding to the employer and establish a period for 
remediation.
191
  Upon expiration of that period, inspectors must conduct a re-inspection 
to confirm that remediation has occurred.
192
  If the violation persists, labor inspectors are 
required to file a notice of the violation with the local office of the Labor Ministry, which 
must then transfer the case within five days to the relevant local court to levy and 
ultimately collect the appropriate fine.
193
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 Phone call between the OTLA and a local contact, November 27, 2012. 
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 Labor Code, art. 433.  The Spanish phrasing of article 433 is: “Compete al servicio de inspección de 
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 Labor Code, art. 436; Ministry of Labor, General Inspection Protocol, p. 20; Meeting between the 
OTLA and the Ministry of Labor’s Director of Inspections, July 25, 2012.  Labor inspectors are also 
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Labor’s Director of Inspections, July 25, 2012.  
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 Labor Code, arts. 439, 442, 711, 715; Ministry of Labor, General Inspection Protocol, p. 20; Meeting 
between the OTLA and the Ministry of Labor’s Director of Inspections, July 25, 2012. 
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The Ministry of Labor’s 2008 General Inspection Protocol and 2011 Inspection Protocol 
for Agriculture  list specific labor rights established in Dominican laws and identify the 
relevant domestic legal provisions and international standards on each right; indicate 
what constitutes compliance, how inspectors are to verify compliance, and possible 
problematic areas; and instruct inspectors to review relevant employer records, speak 
with both employers and workers during inspections, interview workers outside the 
presence of management representatives, and protect the anonymity of workers 
interviewed.
194
 
 
The Ministry of Labor conducts two types of inspections: special inspections, which 
respond to specific requests or complaints filed with the Ministry of Labor; and 
preventive inspections, which are scheduled periodically and proactively focus on 
particularly high-risk sectors or employers.
195
  According to the Ministry of Labor, no 
special inspections were conducted in the sugar sector from 2007 through February 2012 
because no requests for inspections or complaints were filed for that sector during that 
five-year period.
196
  However, the OTLA is aware of one inspection requested on behalf 
of 21 sugar sector workers by a local non-governmental organization on March 8, 2011, 
to which the Ministry reportedly never responded.
197
 
 
On April 16, 2012, the OTLA requested in writing from the Government of the 
Dominican Republic information on any labor inspections conducted in the sugar 
industry since the CAFTA-DR entered into force between the United States and the 
Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007.
198
  Specifically, the OTLA asked for 
“information on where and when those inspections were conducted, the findings of the 
inspections, what remediation of identified problems was requested and the date of that 
remediation, what steps it involved, and the [Government of the Dominican Republic’s] 
role in enforcing that remediation.”199 
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In response, on June 22, 2012, the Government of the Dominican Republic submitted 
documentation to the OTLA summarizing information from 14 reports representing 148 
preventive inspections conducted in the sugar sector from March 1, 2007, through 
February 2012 and attached the 14 corresponding inspection reports as annexes to its 
response.
200
  The Government of the Dominican Republic also attached Annex XVIII to 
its June 22 response to the OTLA, reporting that it conducted 38,604 preventive 
inspections on a national level from January through September 2011.
201
  The 
Government of the Dominican Republic similarly reported to the ILO having conducted 
246,349 preventive inspections nationwide from 2007 through 2010.
202
  Thus, the 
Government of the Dominican Republic reported conducting a total of 284,953 
preventive inspections across the country from March 1, 2007, through September 2011.   
 
The OTLA’s analysis of the information that the Government of the Dominican Republic 
provided to the OTLA and the ILO suggests that the Dominican government has adopted 
two distinct approaches for counting inspections.  While the 14 inspection reports cited 
and annexed to the June 22 response to the OTLA count each inspection of a company as 
a separate event,
203
 the information provided to the OTLA in Annex XVIII of the June 22 
response and to the ILO counts each inspection of a batey or worksite as a separate 
event.
204
  Based on this latter approach, the OTLA review of the 14 inspection reports 
suggests that inspectors visited 148 bateyes or worksites in the sugar sector from March 
1, 2007, through February 2012.
205
 
  
The OTLA’s review also reveals discrepancies between the 14 inspection reports 
provided and the information that the Government of the Dominican Republic reported to 
the ILO for that same period.  These discrepancies include, among others: apparent 
double-counting of five inspection visits in the information provided to the ILO;
206
 and 
                                                 
200
 Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 response, pp. 3-6 and Annex I ((Informes de 
Inspección realizados desde el 2007 a la fecha).  
201
 Ibid., Annex XVIII. 
202
 The Government of the Dominican Republic reported to the ILO that it conducted 65,482 preventive 
inspections in 2010, 62,891 in 2009, 59,503 in 2008, and 58,473 in 2007.  ILO, Verification Report on the 
Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, August – December 2010, p. 136, available from 
http://www.ilo.org/sanjose/publicaciones/WCMS_180195/lang--es/index.htm (last visited September 4, 
2013).   
203
 See Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 response, pp. 3-6 and Annex I.  
204
 See ILO, Verification Report on the Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, August 2009 – 
January 2010, p. 128, fn. 122; Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 response, Annex XVIII. 
205
 Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 response, Annex I.  
206
 For example, the OTLA’s analysis of the January 14, 2010, inspection report (Informe No. 025/10) 
provided by the Government of the Dominican Republic shows that three bateyes were visited by 
inspectors on January 13 (Batey Colonia Elsie Kalil, Batey Consuelito, Batey Los Chicharrones) and three 
bateyes were visited by inspectors on January 14 (Batey Toronja, Batey Experimental, Finca Experimental 
El Peñon UCE).  However, the information reported to the ILO and reflected in the Verification Report on 
the Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, August 2009 – January 2010, which is 
uncorroborated by the inspection reports provided to the OTLA, states that all six of these bateyes were 
visited on January 13 and that five of them were visited again on January 14.  ILO, Verification Report on 
the Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, August 2009 – January 2010, p. 128, fn. 122.  The 
statement suggesting that the Government of the Dominican Republic made 64 inspection visits in the 
sugar sector over this period counts each of these 11 visits as an individual event.    
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the inclusion of an additional 26 inspection visits in the materials for the ILO that are not 
documented in the inspection reports provided to the OTLA.
207
  Such discrepancies raise 
questions regarding consistency in tracking, recording, and reporting on labor inspections 
conducted. 
 
Additionally, the OTLA’s review raises significant concerns about procedural and 
methodological shortcomings in the inspection process that undermine the government’s 
capacity to effectively identify labor violations.  Although the majority of workers whom 
the OTLA encountered in the course of this review spoke Creole, with limited or no 
Spanish,
208
 the Ministry of Labor could not verify that any of its inspectors speak 
Creole.
209
  As a result, Spanish-speaking inspectors were responsible for interviewing 
Creole-speaking workers, calling into question inspectors’ ability to communicate 
directly with workers during the inspection process. 
 
In its review of the 14 inspection reports, OTLA identified particular and significant 
concerns regarding the number of workers with whom inspectors spoke during each site 
visit and the substance of those conversations.  According to the OTLA’s analysis of the 
reports, inspectors did not report speaking with any workers on 117 of the 148 worksites 
visited, or 79 percent.
210
  For nine of the 31 sites where inspectors spoke with a worker, 
inspectors reported speaking with only one worker.
211
  In addition, for six of these 31 
                                                 
207
 The additional 26 bateyes and worksites reported to the ILO as inspection visit sites are:  (1) December 
15, 2009, San Luis (Las Flores, El Ingenio, El Vertedero, San Mateo, Puente Rojo, Cruce de Yabacao); (2) 
December 15, 2009, Guerra (Cyear Nuevo, Cyear Marucho, Batey Yabacao, Batey Chirino, Batey el Talao, 
Batey Hato de Palma, Batey Bayaguana) (3) March 1, 2010, San Pedro de Macorís (Batey Chicharrones, 
Batey Toronja, Batey Carlos Torres Ríos; (4) March 3, 2010, La Romana (Batey Palo Blanco, Batey No. 5, 
Batey No. 16, Batey No. 20, Batey No. 82, Batey Guerrero, Batey Carmoni); (5) March 5, 2010, La 
Romana (Batey Higueral, Batey La Milagrosa); (6) July 8, 2010 (Cristóbal Colón mill).  ILO, Verification 
Report on the Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, August 2009 – January 2010, p. 128, fn. 
122, and Verification Report on the Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, February 2010 – 
July 2010, p. 139, fn. 115.   
208
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012. 
209
 Meeting between the OTLA and the Dominican Ministries of Labor and Foreign Affairs, Santo 
Domingo, July 23, 2012; Meeting between the OTLA and the Ministry of Labor’s Director of Inspections, 
July 25, 2012. 
210
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of December 18, 2007; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 0159/2008, December 17, 
2008; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 079/09, October 22, 
2009; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/10, January 14, 
2010; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 22, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 031/10, January 26, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 028/2010, February 1, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 041/10, February 8, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of March 2, 2010; Government of 
the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 016/2010, March 9, 2010; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/2010, May 18, 2010; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 31, 2011; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 0023/2011, January 31, 2011; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection  of February 29, 2012.  
211
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of December 18, 2007; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 0159/2008, December 17, 
2008; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 079/09, October 22, 
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sites, the inspection reports do not reflect conversations between inspectors and workers 
on topics related to employer compliance with Dominican labor laws.
212
  Thus, the 14 
inspection reports provided by the Government of the Dominican Republic to the OTLA 
suggest that inspectors did not speak to workers about topics relevant to assessing labor 
law compliance on 123 of the 148 sites visited, or 83 percent. 
 
The OTLA review of the 14 reports of inspections in the sugar sector between March 1, 
2007, and February 2012 also reveals that inspectors questioned workers in the presence 
of their supervisors.
213
  Apparent or potential violations of certain Dominican labor laws 
that workers repeatedly reported to the OTLA delegation, such as not receiving paid 
holidays off, working more than the legal limit of 10 hours per day, and not receiving at 
least 36 hours of uninterrupted rest or premium pay in lieu of the rest period,
214
 were not 
cited as violations in any of the reports reviewed by the OTLA.
215
 
 
The OTLA’s analysis of the 14 inspection reports also reveals instances where it appears 
that inspectors did not respond to specific allegations of labor law violations made by 
workers to inspectors during inspections.  Inspectors appear to have failed to discuss the 
allegations with employers; identify violations, as appropriate; and issue related 
warnings.
216
  The few workers interviewed by the OTLA who reported alleging labor law 
violations to labor inspectors also stated that they observed no follow-up or subsequent 
change in conditions.
217
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2009; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 031/10, January 26, 
2010; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 041/10, February 8, 
2010; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/2010, May 18, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 31, 2011; Government 
of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 0023/2011, January 31, 2011.  
212
 For example, inspectors reported conversations in which they spoke with workers exclusively about how 
much sugarcane they were able to cut on average (Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of 
Labor, Inspection of January 22, 2010, p. 3; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, 
Inspection of January 31, 2011, p.3), about when the local harvest would start (Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 22, 2010, p. 5; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 31, 2011, p.5), and about how much of the 
local harvest was mechanized (Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of 
January 31, 2011, p.5).   
213
 See, e.g., Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of December 18, 2007; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 079/09, October 22, 2009; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/10, January 14, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 109/2010, May 18, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 31, 2011; Government 
of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection  of February 29, 2012; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 176, May 9, 2012; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 190, June 6, 2012; Government of the Dominican Republic, 
Ministry of Labor, Inspection of firing of worker 16099, October 18, 2012.   
214
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012. 
215
 Government of the Dominican Republic, June 22 response, pp. 3-6 and Annex I. 
216
 For example, in certain instances when workers complained to inspectors about employers’ failure to 
provide safety equipment and potable water to workers, the inspection reports do not reflect inspectors 
discussing these allegations with employers, issuing warnings, or conducting follow-up inspections. 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 023/2011 of January 31, 2011.   
217
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012.  
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According to the 14 inspection reports, during the 148 documented site visits, inspectors 
appear to have identified 35 labor law violations on 17 sites, 16 of which relate to laws on 
worker nationality and three of which relate to the record keeping requirement to 
maintain a registry of all labor inspections at a worksite.  The inspection reports further 
reflect that although 35 violations were identified on 17 sites, inspectors conducted only 
one follow-up inspection to verify remediation, during which inspectors determined that 
remediation had occurred.
218
  Thus, according to the 14 inspection reports, during the 
five-year period at issue, no case against a sugar company was transferred by the 
Ministry of Labor to the relevant court for the application of a fine for failure to remedy 
an identified labor violation.
219
 
 
The OTLA’s review has thus raised questions and concerns regarding the Government of 
the Dominican Republic’s enforcement of its labor laws in the sugar sector, in particular 
through worksite inspections.  The concerns relate to procedural and methodological 
shortcomings in the inspection process that undermine the government’s capacity to 
effectively identify labor violations, including: (1) interviewing few or no workers; (2) 
failing to discuss topics related to labor law compliance with workers; (3) conducting 
worker interviews with employer representatives present; (4) lacking inspectors with 
language skills, particularly Creole, necessary to communicate effectively with workers; 
(5) failing to follow up on allegations of labor law violations made by workers during the 
inspection process; and (6) failing to conduct follow-up inspections to verify remediation 
of violations identified. 
III. Conclusion  
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related 
to allegations of violations of the labor rights covered by Article 16.8 of the CAFTA-DR 
in the sugar sector.  The OTLA found evidence of apparent and potential violations of 
labor law in that sector with respect to: (1) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health; (2) a minimum age 
for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of 
                                                 
218
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of March 2, 2010.  
219
 Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of December 18, 2007; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 0159/2008, December 17, 
2008; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 079/09, October 22, 
2009; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/10, January 14, 
2010; Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 22, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 031/10, January 26, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 028/2010, February 1, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 041/10, February 8, 2010; 
Government of the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of March 2, 2010; Government of 
the Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 016/2010, March 9, 2010; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 025/2010, May 18, 2010; Government of the 
Dominican Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection of January 31, 2011; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection No. 0023/2011, January 31, 2011; Government of the Dominican 
Republic, Ministry of Labor, Inspection  of February 29, 2012. 
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child labor; and (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor.  
The OTLA also noted concerns in the sugar sector with respect to Dominican labor law 
on freedom of association, the right to organize, and collective bargaining. 
 
Under Article 16.2.1 of the CAFTA-DR, each Party is obligated “not to fail to effectively 
enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a 
manner affecting trade between the Parties.”220  Within the Dominican Republic’s legal 
and institutional framework, the Ministry of Labor’s inspectorate bears primary 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the labor laws,
221
 and the Ministry of Labor’s 
2008 General Inspection Protocol and 2011 Inspection Protocol for Agriculture provide 
inspectors with instructions on how to verify compliance with the labor laws of the 
Dominican Republic in agricultural sectors, including the sugar sector.
222
 
 
The OTLA’s interviews with sugar sector workers and analysis of 14 reports of 
inspections conducted in the sugar sector from March 1, 2007, through February 2012, 
raise questions related to consistency in tracking, recording, and reporting on labor 
inspections and methodological and procedural concerns with the inspections process, 
including failure to follow Dominican Inspection Protocols
223
 that undermine the 
government’s capacity to effectively identify labor violations.  For example, the OTLA 
review raises concerns that labor inspectors interviewed only a small number of workers, 
discussed with workers topics related to labor law compliance in only 17 percent of sites 
inspected, failed to identify or cite certain apparent or potential violations repeatedly 
reported to the OTLA during this review, questioned workers in front of their 
supervisors, spoke Spanish and were unable to communicate directly with Creole-
speaking workers, failed to follow-up on specific worker allegations of labor law 
violations conveyed directly to inspectors during preventive inspections, and failed to 
conduct follow-up inspections to verify remediation of violations identified. 
IV. Recommendations 
 
In order to address the concerns identified in the course of its review, the OTLA makes 
the following recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic, 
particularly regarding enforcement of Dominican labor laws in the sugar sector: 
 
 Follow the Ministry of Labor’s 2008 General Inspection Protocol, 2011 
Inspection Protocol for Agriculture, and other best practices for labor inspections, 
including: 
o speaking with significant numbers of workers chosen by inspectors; 
                                                 
220 CAFTA-DR, art. 16.2.1. 
221
 Labor Code, art. 433.  For the Spanish phrasing of article 433, see fn. 189.  
222
 Ministry of Labor, Agriculture Inspection Protocol; Ministry of Labor, General Inspection Protocol.   
223
 The OTLA interviews with workers, April & July 2012; Government of the Dominican Republic, June 
22 response, Annexes I and XVIII; ILO, Verification Report on the Implementation of White Paper 
Recommendations, August 2009 – January 2010, p. 128, fn. 122, and Verification Report on the 
Implementation of White Paper Recommendations, February 2010 – July 2010, p. 139, fn. 115; Ministry of 
Labor, Agriculture Inspection Protocol; Ministry of Labor, General Inspection Protocol.  
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o interviewing workers outside the presence of management representatives; 
o discussing with workers, in all cases, matters related to labor law 
compliance; 
o following up on allegations of labor law violations made by workers 
during the inspection process; and  
o conducting follow-up inspections to verify remediation of violations 
identified. 
 
 Use labor inspectors or interpreters with the language skills necessary to 
communicate with workers in the sugar sector, in particular Creole;  
 
 Provide training for labor inspectors on methods and best practices for identifying 
forced labor and indicators of forced labor, child labor, and violations of 
acceptable conditions of work, including with respect to minimum wages, hours 
of work, and occupational safety and health, particularly with regards to the sugar 
sector;  
 
 Conduct outreach campaigns to sugar sector workers to inform them of their labor 
rights and increase awareness of existing methods to anonymously complain and 
provide information to the Ministry of Labor about alleged labor law violations.  
Ensure that any such methods involving verbal communication are staffed with 
sufficient personnel with relevant language skills, in particular Creole; 
  
 Formally and publicly commit that the Ministry of Labor will maintain the 
confidentiality and anonymity of workers involved in inspections or who have 
filed complaints with the Ministry, as recommended in the 2008 General 
Inspection Protocol and regardless of migration status; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of the 2012 Minimum Wage Resolution requiring visible 
posting of the minimum wage in the workplace; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of Article 161 of the Labor Code requiring employers to 
record workers’ hours of work and compensation due and effectively enforce 
other labor laws related to hours of work and the minimum wage, with a 
particular focus on ensuring payment of the minimum wage, a 36-hour weekly 
rest period or premium pay or a subsequent day off for working that period, 
workdays under the 10-hour limit for agriculture, and paid holidays; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of relevant laws governing workers’ social security 
contributions to ensure that workers who are legally entitled to social security 
benefits are able to receive them, that employers do not deduct contributions from 
workers who are not legally entitled to receive benefits, and that workers who are 
ineligible for benefits can fully recover any deducted amounts; 
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 Strengthen enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation 522-06 
and Resolution 04-2007 requiring employers to provide all workers with a 
sufficient quantity of potable water or other healthy beverage and free adequate 
personal safety equipment; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of Labor Code Articles 245 and 247 and Labor 
Resolution 52/2004 establishing 14 as the minimum age for legal employment, 
limiting the workday to six hours for children under 16, and banning dangerous 
and unhealthy work for children under 18, to prevent unlawful child labor in the 
sugar sector, including by establishing a system to verify the ages of young 
workers without birth certificates or other legal documentation to help protect 
them from exploitation; 
 
 Strengthen enforcement of Article 62.2 of the Labor Code prohibiting forced 
labor, including by developing and implementing a plan to address conditions 
contributing to and indicators of forced labor, including but not limited to 
unlawful overtime performed under threat, deceptive recruitment practices, fear of 
dismissal or deportation for formally complaining about unlawful labor 
conditions, fear of deportation or denouncement to authorities for quitting work or 
leaving the bateyes, a bonus payment system that creates pressure for workers to 
return to work each season or remain on the bateyes year-round, and growing 
indebtedness to local privately-owned colmados on the bateyes. 
 
The OTLA will engage with the Government of the Dominican Republic to address the 
concerns identified in this report and implement the above recommendations.  The OTLA 
will work with the Government of the Dominican Republic to develop time-bound steps 
and measurable milestones by which to monitor and assess progress and will review 
implementation of the recommendations six months and again 12 months after the 
publication of this report. 
